

# Princeton in the CIA's service

By JOHN CAVANAGH GS, SALLY FRANK '80, and LAURIE KIRBY GS

There is nothing covert about the CIA employment interviews taking place today in Clio Hall. But that should not deceive any of us about the nature of the CIA's activities.

As citizens of the United States, we need to be aware of the actions the CIA carries out in our name. As Princeton students and faculty, we must understand the history of covert CIA intrusions into our campus, activity which is still permitted by the university today.

From Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954) and the Congo (1960), to Chile (1973) and Angola (1975), the CIA has made it its business to overthrow governments and to install (or attempt to install) dictatorial regimes sympathetic to United States business and military interests.

These interventions are not merely the dark underside of American foreign policy. Rather, they reflect the mainstream of establishment through from World War II to the present, a consensus which has been nourished in respectable institutions such as this university. Not coincidentally, there is also a long and multi-faceted tradition of Princeton in the CIA's service.

## Breeding ground

From Allen W. Dulles '14 (later a Princeton trustee), who was the CIA's first director, to William E. Colby '40, who played a key role in the CIA's secret war in Laos, in the 1973 "destabilization" of democratic government in Chile, and in the Phoenix program of torture and murder in Vietnam, and who was CIA director from 1973 to 1975, Princeton has been a particularly fertile breeding ground for the agency, right up to the present Deputy Director, Frank J. Carlucci '52.

CIA recruitment at Princeton has benefited from the active participation of university officials. Former Career Services director Newell Brown admitted in 1976 to *The Daily Princetonian*, "We are aware of the kinds of people the CIA looks for and when we run into the type we tell them to send a resume."

But not all CIA recruiting at Princeton has been conducted through Career Services. An article in the *Trenton Times* of February 12, 1975, reported the story of a Princeton senior summoned in the late 1960's to meet with the dean of students, at that time the university's chief disciplinarian. However, Dean William D'O. Lippincott '41 had other things than discipline on his mind:

" 'I understand you've been interviewing with the CIA,' the dean said. The senior found the question perplexing. It was true that he had applied for a job at the intelligence agency, but officials there had insisted on complete confidentiality. How had the dean of students found out?

"The answer was soon forthcoming. 'You see,' the student recalls Lippincott saying, 'I'm with the agency.' And I thought we might have a talk — confidential, of course — about its work.' "

## A spy in our midst

The CIA announced last year that it will continue the secret recruiting of foreign students at American universities. Such students have been used to report on the political activities of their compatriots. These reports are often communicated to secret police agencies abroad with potentially dangerous consequences for the students and their families.

Foreign students' fears about CIA spying are not merely conjectural. In May 1967, the Woodrow Wilson School was forced to admit that several students had been working covertly for the CIA while participating in the school's summer program abroad. Embarrassed WWS officials responded by issuing a ban on "any covert intelligence activity while the student is enrolled in school" (*The Washington Post*, May 4, 1967). The policy apparently applies, however, only to WWS graduate students, not to its undergraduates or professors.

According to Dean of the College Joan Girgus (*The Daily Princetonian*, October 24, 1978), Princeton University has no specific prohibition against the covert recruitment of foreign students. In contrast, Harvard President Derek C. Bok has taken a firm public stand against covert CIA activity on his campus, charging it threatens "the integrity and independence of the academic community."

Princeton professors have been involved with the CIA in many different capacities. Former history professor Joseph Strayer, for example, took a year's leave of absence from Princeton to work at CIA

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headquarters in Maclean, Virginia, and also worked there several summers.

Paul Sigmund, professor of politics, cofounded (in 1958) and served as Executive Officer of the CIA-funded Independent Research Service, which compiled political dossiers on participants in World Youth Festivals. Since the other cofounder, Gloria Steinem, admitted in *The New York Times* (February 21, 1967) that "the CIA has been a major source of funds" for the organization, it is highly unlikely that Sigmund was unaware of the CIA connection.

A dark area of CIA involvement at Princeton is that of covert research. In 1977 it was revealed that Princeton professors had participated in MK-ULTRA, a secret CIA program in mind control through hallucinogenic drugs. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has refused to make public the results of its investigation into CIA university research, however, stating that the CIA considered educational activities "perhaps its most sensitive domestic area."

In its thirty-two-year history, the CIA has exhibited a consistent pattern of participation in coups, assassinations, torture-training, and subversion of people's fundamental right to self-determination. Although this history is too long and extensive to review here, two examples of CIA activities should illuminate the nature of the Agency's means and ends.

On September 11, 1973, democracy in Chile was overthrown in a bloody military coup. The military junta which then seized power has since suppressed all democratic freedoms, murdered approximately 30,000 of its own citizens, and jailed and tortured tens of thousands more.

This coup followed a CIA campaign to "destabilize" the elected government. According to the 1975 staff report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Covert U.S. involvement in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973 was extensive and continuous. . . . It financed activities covering a broad spectrum, from simple propaganda manipulation of the press to large-scale support for Chilean political parties . . . to direct attempts to foment a military camp."

#### **But no rebirth from the ashes**

"Operation Phoenix" in Vietnam, the brainchild of William E. Colby '40, displays another of the CIA's specialties: assassination. While statistics on the numbers detained, killed, and "rallied" to the Saigon government under Phoenix vary from source to source, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dennis Doolin admitted that at least 26,369 South Vietnamese civilians were killed through the operation while it was under direct American control (January 1968 through August 1972).

Torture was the standard operating procedure of Phoenix. "Everybody who was there accepted torture as routine," said Robert F. Gould, Colby's legal advisor in Saigon. "I never knew an individual to be detained as a 'Viet Cong' suspect who ever lived through an interrogation," testified K. Barton Osborn, a former agent handler for Phoenix.

The CIA has also been actively infringing human rights at home — for example, in the MK-Chaos program which involved keeping secret files on thousands of U.S. citizens "suspected" of political activity. Deputy Director Carlucci said in a seminar at Princeton last Friday (November 9, 1979) that the program had been "pared back" since its notorious heyday in the '60s — but not stopped.

In light of the CIA's record both at home and abroad, a number of questions can be raised about present CIA campus activity:

First, in November, 1978, it was revealed that Barnaby C. Keeny, who was president of Brown University from 1955 to 1966, had worked for the CIA during the entire time he was president. The Princeton University community has the right to demand of President Bowen that he state, for the record, whether he, or anyone in his administration, does now or has ever worked for the CIA.

Second, the only rule at Princeton concerning CIA intelligence operations is that faculty so engaged should tell their department chairman. Moreover, the Princeton rules for secret research are so loose as to permit the MK-ULTRA experiments to take place today. We should ask whether faculty work with a covert organization does not undermine the very principles of academic openness which Princeton purports to hold sacred.

Finally, both graduate and undergraduate students, should look carefully at this organization, which has consistently and willfully broken the laws of the United States and has committed countless crimes against humanity, in violation of international law. We should ask whether we want to participate, individually or as members of an institution, in providing a forum for the marketing of the CIA.

## 'Sparty' guarded as MSU expects attack of 'Blues'

EAST LANSING — Michigan State University was on alert today over reports that spies were in the area from Ann Arbor's "Go Blue Country."

"Are you a spy?" was the big-daddy question as Darryl Rogers' football team laid low for Bo Schembechler's boys for the big game tomorrow at Spartan Stadium. Students were checked out. Those resembling odd creatures were detained for questioning.

These reports of covert operations, though unfounded, nevertheless were intensified by an article in October's Penthouse magazine that CIA's spies were operating on 100 campuses and employing more than 350 teachers and administrators to do their thing.

Penthouse author Ernest Volkman said, in his "Spies on the Campus" article, that thousands of gullible students are recruited by the CIA and used as pawns, stooges and future spies, infringing on both their academic and personal freedoms and on ours. There is no higher priority at the CIA than maintaining its operations on campus, he said.

MSU President Cecil Mackey had no comment at this time. But precautions were taken. Security has been tightened at the bronze statue of the dear Ol' Spartan, called "Sparty" affectionately by the MSU crowd and other things by the U. of M. crowd. "Sparty" has been a previous target.

Suzy Q of MSU, my personal agent, whispers that the crisis has affected scholastic standards. In one incident this week an irate professor lectured his class over their poor results on a written exam.

"The average mark I gave was 1.05," he said disgusted.

## Charley Manos



ly. One student rose and was about to leave.

"I didn't intend to discourage you," he said.

"You didn't," she said. "But, thank God, I'm in the wrong class."

And so as clouds move over the campus today there was no evidence of any insidious deeds. The Cedar River hopefully will flow steadily with "Go Green" waves until tomorrow when the bounce of the ball determines who's what.

Meanwhile, Rose Bowl Rosey, my mutt weaned on U. of M. propaganda, and I are wearing two hats. One is undercover.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 64

PENTHOUSE  
October 1979

The secret alliance between college professors and administrators and the CIA has destroyed the independence and integrity of the American academic community.

# SPIES ON CAMPUS

BY ERNEST VOLKMAN

In the early spring of 1976, Harvard University President Derek Bok began reading a 651-page green paperbound book with the forbidding title, "Foreign and Military Intelligence: Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities" (more popularly known as the Church Committee Report).

Like most other prominent academics, Bok was aware that for years some members of the academic community and the CIA had joined together in a secret relationship to turn many of America's university and college campuses into virtual espionage centers. He was aware that a number of professors and administrators were secretly working for the CIA, recruiting prospective agents among students, spying for the agency while overseas, sometimes helping to spy on "troublemaking" students, and using the cover of research institutes and other projects to gather intelligence.

And, most important, Bok was aware that people at Harvard were involved. He did not know how many or who they were, but he wanted it stopped.

Because the Church Committee had spent more than a year in investigating the CIA's domestic operations, including involvement with academia, Bok carefully read through the committee's final report, looking for facts—facts that would allow him to write up guidelines for the university to set strict limits on such work for anybody who worked there.

But the report was a disappointment. On page 189, Bok found, instead of facts, this general statement: "The Central Intelligence Agency is now using several hundred American academics, who in addition to providing leads and, on occasion, making introductions for intelligence purposes, occasionally write books and other material to be used for propaganda purposes abroad. Beyond these, an additional few score are used in an unwitting manner for minor activities."

"These academics are located in over 100 American colleges, universities, and related institutes."

The report went on to recommend that the universities and colleges themselves "set the professional and ethical standards of its members," and that federal legislation prohibiting CIA activities on

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Shortly after Bok finished reading Church Committee report, he gathered together a small group of men to take a close look at the CIA-Harvard link and come up with guidelines for the university governing such activity. Bok made no public announcement of his action, despite the fact that his group included some Harvard heavyweights with extensive Washington experience. Among them was Archibald Cox, ex-Watergate special prosecutor, and Don Price, then dean of the university's Kennedy School of Government and an old Washington hand. (Ironically, Harvard's School of Government has provided many of the most infamous presidential advisers on "national security" affairs, including Henry Kissinger, who was in charge of all covert operations for most of the Nixon years; McGeorge Bundy, a Harvard dean who performed the same function for John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson; and Samuel Huntington, now on Carter's National Security Council.)

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## Letters

### *C.I.A. probe 'reveals both our national sensitivity to threats to our privacy and our ambivalence on this issue'*

#### TO THE EDITOR:

Your article "Documents Reveal C.I.A. Probed U. S. Students" (July 23) reveals both our national sensitivity to threats to our privacy from official intrusion and our ambivalence on this issue in practice.

The record suggests that we are more sensitive to potential threats of this sort from some sources than from others. For example, the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency or the Federal Bureau of Investigation in such activity is sure to result in a headline. But are we as alert to potential abuses from other directions?

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1975 is a case in point. In the guise of protecting the rights of students to privacy from unauthorized release of their educational records, Congress gave the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare sweeping powers to inspect institutional records at any time without a court order or any need to show cause for such an inspection, and without prior notice to any individual affected.

Similarly, the Veterans Administration under Public Law 94-502, section 510, has been granted the authority to examine the educational records of veterans or non-veterans enrolled in any postsecondary educational institution. Once again, no prior notice, no "show cause," and no court order are required.

In short, there is no such thing under present laws as privacy of one's educational record. Any representative of H.E.W. or of the V.A. may inspect any record of any student or former student at any time, for any purpose which the agency asserts to be in pursuit of its legal obligations. Congress has given these agencies unlimited authority to pry into the educational background of American students, in part to "insure their privacy."

Meanwhile, we continue to devote our time and attention to real and imagined abuses of the past from the Vietnam and Watergate eras. There is no doubt that there were real threats to our civil liberties during these periods. It is clear, too, that these abuses took place in contraven-

tion of the law. What is reassuring is that the law placed effective limits upon the zealots who claimed to be protecting us from internal or external threats.

Today, however, our preoccupation with the past has blinded us to the larger threat before us. Our bureaucracy appears intent upon protecting us from ourselves. It will "protect" our privacy even if it must destroy our civil liberties in the process. And Congress has given it police-state tools to do so.

A future imperial President will have reason to thank us for our lack of foresight in the 1970's. It may well prove to be the decade in which the seeds of American totalitarianism were planted.

JOHN T. MOORE  
Registrar  
Susquehanna University  
Selinsgrove, Pa.

# Court Orders Disclosure of CIA-University Ties

WASHINGTON

A federal judge here has entered the Central Intelligence Agency to release the names of dozens of universities and researchers involved in controversial "mind control" research it financed in the 1960's and 1970's.

However, the judge deferred action on the order until Oct. 1 to give the C.I.A. time to contact the researchers to determine if they have any objections to the disclosures. The delay also will allow the C.I.A. time to designate the names as classified information, if appropriate, or to appeal the entire order.

The ruling followed requests by associates of consumer advocate Ralph Nader for the entire list of universities involved in the drug and behavioral-modification projects, code-named MX-ULTRA. In 1977 and 1978 the intelligence agency released the names of many universities that did not object to having their C.I.A. connections made public.

One of the lawyers who requested the names, John C. Sims, said it was possible that some of the researchers

involved still did not know that their studies had been financed with C.I.A. money "laundered" through foundations and research institutes.

In his ruling, U. S. District Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer said he had given "careful consideration" to arguments by C.I.A. Director Stansfield Turner that disclosure of the names of universities and researchers involved in the project would compromise C.I.A. "sources and methods."

In conducting the research, C.I.A. officials said they had hoped to better understand "brainwashing" techniques purportedly used by foreign governments. The C.I.A. also sponsored the research to find ways to get information from foreign agents.

## 'Invasion of Privacy'

To protect its sources in such research, Judge Oberdorfer suggested that the C.I.A. might properly classify the records on the grounds that their release could constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy" of individual researchers.

As for universities, the judge said, their names also might be classified under a Presidential order that gives the C.I.A. director the authority to classify matters "in the interest of national defense or foreign policy."

Despite those suggestions, Judge Oberdorfer argued in favor of full disclosure. The situation, he said, "involves behavioral research that was carried on, for the most part, at American universities, with the witting or unwitting participation of American students, for a purpose which may be collateral to the main business of intelligence, and to an uncertain result."

Institutions thus far identified by the C.I.A. as having housed the C.I.A.-sponsored research are:

Columbia University, Cornell University and its medical school, the University of Denver, Emory University, the University of Florida, George Washington University, Harvard University, the University of Houston, the University of Illinois, Indiana University, the Johns Hopkins University, the University of Maryland, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, McGill University, the University of Minnesota, Montana State College, the Ohio State University, the University of Oklahoma, the University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University, Princeton University, Queens College of the City University of New York, Rutgers University, the University of Richmond, Stanford University School of Medicine, the University of Texas, Texas Christian University, and the University of Wisconsin.

## CIA Given Until Oct. 1 To Disclose Colleges In Drug Experiments

By Allan Frank  
 Washington Star Staff Writer

Two Washington-area activists seeking to force disclosure of the CIA's use of universities for controversial drug and human behavior experimentation have won a limited victory in their Freedom of Information Act suit.

U.S. District Judge Louis Oberdorfer yesterday ordered the CIA to disclose the names of the universities involved in the CIA program, code-named MK-ULTRA, to two Ralph Nader associates, John Cary Sims and Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe.

However, Oberdorfer said he would give the CIA until Oct. 1 to disclose those names and advised the agency how to classify the names of the schools involved under other laws.

The judge suggested that the CIA might properly classify the records because their release could constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy" of the individual researchers. Oberdorfer said the CIA should contact all researchers involved and ask whether each one objected to release of his or her name.

He added that the names of institutions also might be reclassified properly under a presidential order which allows the CIA director to classify matters "in the interest of national defense or foreign policy."

The CIA has released the names of about two-thirds of the schools involved, but has declined to release the others, as well as the names of many of the researchers.

Among the schools that did not object to the disclosure of their names in connection with the experimentation programs that were begun in the 1950s and ended in 1972 were Cornell, Harvard, Michigan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Princeton and Stanford.

In an affidavit CIA Director Stansfield Turner claimed that the identities of the schools and researchers should not be disclosed because such revelations would compromise CIA "sources and methods."

Oberdorfer had earlier ruled that the CIA could not properly claim that the schools and researchers were "intelligence sources."

Oberdorfer wrote that "the present situation . . . involves behavioral research that was carried on, for the most part, at American universities, with the witting or unwitting participation of American students, for a purpose which may be collateral to the main business of intelligence, and to an uncertain result."

# RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Morning Sound: News STATION WHUR-FM Radio  
DATE July 30, 1979 8:00 AM CITY Washington, D. C.  
SUBJECT CIA and Its Links to American Colleges

ADRIANNE FELTON: Congress is also working on legislation that could prohibit CIA surveillance on American campuses. That legislation brought the Campaign for Political Rights to Capitol Hill yesterday to brief college students on the violations of rights of privacy that often occur.

Morton Halperin, head of the Center for National Security Studies and a former special assistant to Henry Kissinger, told students they might be having a conference with a teacher concerning classwork when, in fact, the information may be directed to the CIA to blackmail students into working for them.

MORTON HALPERIN: The CIA has now admitted that it has secret relationships with university professors, administrators and some students. The CIA uses those contacts in order to get information which it uses to recruit people to work covertly for the CIA. These are primarily foreign students, although, in some cases, the CIA has also used this network of secret contacts to gather information about American students and about American professors.

This means that on over a hundred American college campuses there are secret CIA spies in secret contact with the CIA, and secretly gathering information about the private lives and political views of their students.

FELTON: ...students at colleges and universities to try and force the institutions they attend to spell out specific ground rules for CIA and other intelligence activities on America's campuses.

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ON PAGE 6

THE DAILY TEXAN (U. of Texas)  
25 July 1979

# CIA recruitment criticized

By LYNNE NIEMIEC

Six CIA operatives are working out of a Dallas attorney's office to covertly recruit students to act as informants, a former CIA agent said last Friday.

John Stockwell, a 12-year member of the CIA and former chief of the Angolan Task Force, said the operatives cover all Southwest Conference schools and Louisiana State

University.

Professors working for the CIA set up interviews with students, Stockwell said. While students are unaware the interviews are with the CIA, Stockwell added that nearly all the professors involved are aware of the purpose of the interviews.

"Third World elite students and students about to study in foreign countries" are prime candidates for CIA recruit-

ment, Stockwell said.

Students are told by the operatives that they will be acting as consultants for a large company planning to invest large amounts of money in the student's home country.

Students who agree to act as consultants are not told they have been acting as informants until they are too involved to get out of the arrangement, Stockwell added.

Stockwell quit the CIA in 1977 and was offered a job as a covert student recruiter before quitting.

Stockwell said the operatives rotate campuses to keep from becoming known. Various cover stories and business credentials are used in each visit.

**STOCKWELL SAID** Money is no problem in CIA operations and some professors who deliver top candidates are paid as much as \$1,000 per month.

Stockwell said, however, that the "Walter Mitty factor" is the main reason professors become involved in the recruitment program. "What can be more satisfying than to have a real secret life," Stockwell said. "People like to feel a little more important than they are."

Dale Patterson, chief of media relations for CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., said Tuesday, "I have no comment whatsoever about the program."

KARL SCHMITT, chairman of the government department, said he had never heard of the program, as did other University professors and department spokesmen.

Stockwell said he believes the CIA should be shut down because "secrecy doesn't breed quality. Secrecy breeds mistakes."

"It is common for the CIA to be off in its intelligence information," Stockwell said.

Stockwell said he believes in what he calls the "Allen Dulles school of intelligence." That school holds that "the operative should be known by the people so the people know who to tell secrets to," he added.

Stockwell said he does not believe the oath of secrecy that CIA agents take is valid and said it is "used to intimidate and suppress by the CIA."

"It is preposterous. It's impossible. You can't sign someone at 25 and then expose them to crimes and then wave a piece of paper at them. It wouldn't stand up in court."

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
10 May 1979

### Readers write

In the report ["Role of the campus with CIA sets off heated debate"] on the CIA and academia, I was mistakenly credited with charges and positions I had not made nor taken.

For the record, I argued that the presence of CIA employees as administrators and teachers on our university and college campuses is a conflict of interest and detrimental to the usual function of our institutions of higher learning. I did not charge that Georgetown University was remiss in fulfilling its pledge to enforce standards of noninvolvement with the CIA; I have not seen those standards in print.

Secondly, I did not charge that the Ferdowsi University Project with Georgetown was in fact a cover operation for clandestine political activities; I have not seen nor possess evidence to even suggest the charge.

While I shared a platform with others at a Georgetown University forum on the CIA and academia, I did not share many of the positions or opinions of the other speakers. The mistake in attributing the charges to me may have resulted from the misleading title for the evening as well as the implied charges by other speakers.

The high standards of reporting usually found in the Monitor are not marred in my opinion by the story in question. I only ask that the corrections be duly noted and more coverage be given in the press to the issue of conflict of interests."

Thomas M. Ricks  
Department of History  
Georgetown University

Washington



# The CIA on American Campuses: Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Editor's Note: M.I.T. has become the latest in a growing line of American universities to reexamine the relationship between the intelligence community and the academic community.<sup>1</sup> The M.I.T. Report provides a detailed and thoughtful discussion of some of the problems, conflicting values, and solutions. The excerpts which are reprinted below explain why the covert intelligence role is in fact a serious threat to the well-being of the academic community.

But a few words should also be said about another, related set of problems, which the Report does not deal with directly but which are reflected everywhere in its recommendations that academics exercise caution. For instance, while one recommendation that we reprint makes it clear that no one connected with M.I.T. should knowingly become a covert operative for the CIA, the Report's discussion of gray areas shows that there is a limit to what the well-intentioned academic can do in the face of the intelligence community's clandestine habits.

How, for example, is an academic to know if a State Department official who wants to chat about some foreign country is really a CIA operative using a State Department cover? And how is an academic to decide what to do when a friendly and knowledgeable contact is rumored to be a CIA agent? Or, in the case of recruitment, an academic might offer information about students to an intelligence operative using a private organization as cover. In such situations, safeguarding academic freedom depends not only on the good faith of the academic community, but on the willingness of the clandestine agencies to abide by university guidelines.

This brings us to the context in which the M.I.T. Report, like comparable sets of university guidelines around the country, appears. When Harvard University became the first institution to follow the Church Committee's recommendation and to set up guidelines for the members of its community to follow, it also became embroiled in drawn out discussions with the CIA. In these, CIA Director Stansfield Turner has made it clear that the CIA will not honor the standards set up by a university. Apparently, if the Agency can induce professors, administrators, or students knowingly to violate a university code of conduct, the CIA will do so. And that being the case, it goes without saying that the Agency's options with unwitting academics are likewise open.

The M.I.T. Report does not mention the Turner intransigence, but its discussion of gray areas implicitly acknowledges that the CIA will not cooperate with university guidelines. As it stands, the hapless academic cannot determine who is or is not a CIA agent. Only CIA agents know who they are, and if they are under instructions to disregard university guidelines, the integrity and reputation of American institutions of learning will be compromised in the world community.

And indeed, as the M.I.T. Report also points out, this is not a purely hypothetical concern. The M.I.T. community has already had the experience of foreign sources refusing to discuss matters of scholarly interest for fear that the scholar was really working

These excerpts are  
Committee on M.I.  
lished in *Massach*  
April 11, 1979. Vc

## INTERIM AD HOC MIT ANL AGENCIES

By Kenneth Hoffman, chairman; Louis Menand III; Ascher H. Shapiro; Phyllis A. Wallace; Myron Weiner and John M. Wynne.

### The MIT Report defines the critical issues:

There are a few issues, however, which almost uniquely involve our relations with intelligence agencies, and with the Central Intelligence Agency in particular. Most of these concern the clandestine recruitment and/or surveillance of foreign citizens who are members of the MIT community. In our opinion, these are simultaneously the most serious issues we face and the most difficult ones to deal with.

### The MIT Report cites responsibilities within the academic community:

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As a second principle we cite the need to maintain a high level of *mutual trust* among the members of our university community. Without it, the kind of openness we seek is not possible. We would like to comment on three aspects of the trust we should have in one another.

- (i) The foundation of this trust is the knowledge that the primary dedication of each member is to the intellectual enterprise which we pursue. Hidden motives tend to break down the bonds of trust that open communication requires. This is true whether the hidden motive is the coveting of personal gain and recognition or the patriotic desire to help an outside agency gather information about other members of the community. The special kind of openness which surrounds our activities is something which requires a very special kind of dedication, a dedication which is almost total.
- (ii) Members of our academic community should be able to rely on the fact that the views they express, whether they be on physics, philosophy or politics, will be judged in the community solely on the basis of their intellectual merit and will be used only as part of the intellectual enterprise. Should we become aware, for example, that some members of our community were transmitting to outside agencies political views which other members had expressed in the course of our ongoing dialogue, it would be quite destructive of trust.

# A scholarly appraisal of American assassinations

By John Jacobs

University of California at Berkeley professor Peter Dale Scott's first love is writing poetry, teaching Chaucer and Dante and engaging in medieval scholarship.

But his concept of what a scholar should do in the 20th century has led him into far more current and controversial subjects over the last 15 years: the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the role of the CIA in the major events of our time.

And his work has become must reading for serious students of the assassinations in this country since 1963 and the role of the CIA.

A 1976 book he helped edit and contributed to is titled, "The Assassinations: Dallas and Beyond — A Guide to Cover-Ups and Investigations." A hot-selling paperback of a few years back, "They've Killed the President, They've Killed the President," written by journalist Robert Sam Anson, was based in large part on an unpublished manuscript by Scott. And he's narrated network specials on the assassination for the Canadian Broadcasting Corp.

A professorial looking man of 50, given to wearing corduroy and tweeds with elbow patches, Scott is of medium height and size, with brown hair, a gray-brown beard and sparkling blue eyes. He was born in Canada and spent four years in the Canadian foreign service, including two years with the High Commission in Warsaw, Poland.

He also has a Ph.D. in political science — an unusual credential for an English professor. But after publishing two essays on the "Medieval-Latin Pastoral," he moved from the Rhetoric Department to English, where he later became tenured.

Scott says the evolution of his thinking and research follows a logical progression, predicated on "what the role should be of a leisured scholar in society."

"One should use that leisure to combat ignorance," he said in an interview in his office on the fourth floor of Wheeler Hall on the UC campus, where he sat surrounded by books, notes, manuscripts, file cabinets and news clippings.

"There was a lot of ignorance about the Vietnam War, so it was right for the faculty to take a stand against it. Support for the war was based on ignorance, so it was correct for scholars to write books exposing conscious misstatements of fact."

"I was very naive at first. I felt that if I wrote to the State Department and The New York

Times and told them they had the negotiating position of the North Vietnamese wrong, they'd correct it. But they didn't and that led to the books."

Scott's first book on the subject, which he co-authored with UC professors Franz Schurmann and Reginald Zelnik, was called, "The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam." His research there, he said, led him to consider the role the CIA played in the war, particularly after the Kennedy assassination, and from there to the assassination itself.

The Kennedy administration, Scott says, had decided in October 1963 to withdraw 1,000 troops from Vietnam. On Nov. 20 the announcement was made. Two days later Kennedy was dead. And two days after that, Scott says, a secret Defense Department memo was approved — with heavy CIA participation — that significantly changed the nature of American commitment to Vietnam. He says the 1,000 troops were never withdrawn.

"The first real commitment to win the Vietnam war was made on Nov. 24," he said. "It wasn't a 180-degree shift, but it was a significant shift in the language of commitment."

Scott also says that, before his death, Kennedy was also toying with the idea of a rapprochement with Fidel Castro, following the disaster of the Bay of Pigs, the tension of the Cuban missile crisis the year before and covert attempts by the CIA and Cuban nationals to subvert their revolution.

The professor says he doesn't believe there was any one single motive for the killing, but noted that both Vietnam and Cuba "were important symbols of prolonging the Cold War and most upsetting to interests in this country appalled by what Kennedy was doing."

Of all the assassinations of public figures in the '60s and early '70s, at least five were politically motivated, he says — John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr. and George Wallace.

"There was a period in U.S. history when assassinations were used to determine the outcome of elections," he says. "In 1964 John Kennedy was taken out. In 1968 Robert Kennedy was taken out. And in 1972 George Wallace was taken out."

STAT

*The following is an editorial from the Florida Alligator, the student newspaper at the University of Florida in Gainesville. Beginning today, this space will be reserved for comments from other student newspapers across the country. This week's article focuses on the school's involvement with the Central Intelligence Agency.*

Tom Wicker puts it rather nicely.

In dissecting the aura of deception surrounding the "national security mystique," the noted columnist for The New York Times spends much space in his book *On Press* shooting holes in the government's favorite claim to secrecy. Wicker says:

THE NATIONAL security mystique goes so little challenged, in or out of government... The record of Vietnam alone ought sufficiently to discredit the notion of government infallibility and the assumption of selfless virtue. But it hasn't. The mystique persists...

The validity of the veteran journalist's observations is

# No mystique in our national security

Editorial from the University of Florida student newspaper

strikingly clear when brought down to the podunk level of a state university and its student newspaper. The Alligator uncovered last month the existence of the first CIA grant awarded to UF researchers in years. Three scientists are conducting research which the CIA eventually hopes to use in developing a lie detector test that probes the secrecy of the brain.

The hesitancy of UF officials to release, upon Alligator demand, the research proposal drafted by the three UF scientists puts Tom Wicker's contentions in an interesting light.

UF administrators withheld the proposal for a full week—against the Florida Public Records Law—while debating the merits of publicizing the research.

IN BUYING time, Tigert brass

warned of giant cancellations and the revealing the proposal we had so diligently requested. "If the enemy were to get hold of the principle (of the research), warned official spokesman Hugh Cunningham, "then the enemy could then begin to pursue counteractive methods."

Nonsense. "The enemy" no doubt already is well aware of what the CIA is studying. The CIA did not even bother classifying the UF document top secret. And the proposal, as it later developed after UF brass hats relinquished the document, had little to say in terms of CIA intent anyway.

Wicker notes:

THE NATIONAL security myth "persists, too, despite evidence of how often the phrase is used merely for purposes of covering up what an ad-

ministration does not want to be known.

"It's persistence of course, is some degree owing to the fact that there is a national security and there are some secrets vital to it. But this truism is consistently blown out of all proportion to what are probably relatively few secrets vital to national security."

THAT UF scientists are conducting experiments for the CIA is at least disconcerting, but in view of academic freedom and the good that can come out of some research, we find it difficult to advocate any prohibitions.

The official UF preference for the national security mystique in this case, however, is more disturbing. The UF faculty senate should consider pushing for the establishment of a standing committee that review such UF research proposals thereby providing a procedure for public notification.

If an institution of enlightenment and learning is going to conduct research for an agency of questionable moral and ethical integrity, the public at least ought to have the right to know about the relationship. The national security mystique should not be allowed to hide it.

THE STANFORD DAILY  
Stanford University  
20 February 1979

# CIA accused of covertly recruiting students

By Mark Nassutti

The CIA has refused to admit that it covertly recruits foreign students on college campuses in the United States because, "if the American public finds out what they are doing, they will be forced to stop what they are doing," Morton Halperin, president of the Center for National Security Studies, told an audience of about 150 persons in Terman Auditorium Friday afternoon.

Many colleges and universities prohibit covert recruiting, he said, but the CIA simply ignores the prohibitions.

He said the only way for universities to stop covert CIA campus recruitment is to state clearly their opposition to it. He said that such opposition will be heeded by Congress, which is currently drafting a new charter for the CIA.

Congress won't fight

"If the universities remain silent," Halperin said, "Congress will take the attitude that of the 72 issues they will be fighting the CIA on, they won't bother to fight this one if the universities don't want it fought."

In response to complaints from universities over alleged covert recruitment practices, the CIA stated that it "recruits all staff openly," Halperin said. He noted, however, that by definition, anyone recruited for covert activities could not be recruited openly.

The CIA's response to criticism of its policies, Halperin said, is that it "should be able to do anything we have to in order to fulfill our function."

The process of recruitment is complex, Halperin said. CIA agents approach professors known to have contacts with foreign students posing as writers for specialized publications, he explained. They say they are looking for students to write for these publications.

It is almost impossible for a professor or a student to know they are being approached by a CIA agent, Halperin said. If they do realize what is going on, Halperin said, they usually have difficulty making specific accusations. "People are approached in such an elliptical way that you don't know what you've really refused," he explained.

Halperin said that sometimes professors are asked openly by CIA agents to assist in recruiting foreign students. He said he is opposed to this because "a university professor does not have the right to engage in conversation with a student, when the purpose is to obtain information from the student which can be used to convince the student to go back to his home country and spy for the CIA."

Make people aware

The most effective way to fight covert recruitment, according to Halperin, is for universities to make professors and foreign students aware of it. "It is no longer possible (for universities) to hide in ignorance. The CIA has effectively admitted what it is doing and it's up to the universities to say something about it," he said.

Halperin pointed out that Stanford does not explicitly prohibit covert recruitment. John Schwartz, University counsel, explained that "after the issue received notoriety about a year ago, the question was put to the Faculty Senate and discussed. The Faculty Senate consensus was that the existing policy of the University on the secrecy of research was sufficient as a general policy to deal with the CIA recruitment."

No secret research

According to Schwartz, the policy states that no agency may contract secret research with University faculty.

research with faculty members here but there are no secret contracts. He added that the CIA is "interested in students from all countries. There is an open-ended generalized interest in recruiting students from all over the world."

Asked if any foreign intelligence agencies were known to be operating at Stanford, Halperin said, "Any country with substantial concentrations of students here would be very likely to have agents on campus."

Halperin cited Taiwan, South Korea and the now deposed Iranian government as possibilities.

According to Halperin, there is a CIA station in the Bay area which is "secret, undercover, in constant communication with Washington and the various universities in the area. It is very hard to find these people."

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 7

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
7 February 1979

# Role of the campus with CIA sets off heated debate

## Recruitment and research at stake; guidelines sought

By John K. Cooley  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Should the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or other United States intelligence organizations recruit and employ active informants and researchers on university campuses?

Does a secret or open relationship with an intelligence agency compromise a teacher, student, or university administrative officer, not to mention the academic freedom of the institution concerned?

Recent developments on at least some campuses would seem to suggest that the answers are "no" to the first question and "yes" to the second.

Anti-CIA rallies at Georgetown University here in Washington, at Princeton, and at other universities have shown vehement student and faculty opposition to CIA involvement. Both student and off-campus activist groups are claiming that affiliations with the CIA have also dragged US universities into involvement in the American intelligence and foreign policy failures in Iran.

Now the whole question of the CIA on campus is being squarely addressed by congressional committees that are working on the draft of a "charter" for US intelligence activities.

The draft charter, congressional sources say, would allow intelligence agencies to use American scholars traveling abroad for "operational assistance," provided a senior official at such a person's institution were notified of any paid relationship.

Academics could help intelligence agencies to recruit at home or abroad. One version recommended in last year's report of the Senate Intelligence Committee, chaired by Frank Church (D) of Idaho, would permit use of academicians and would require that the officials of the institutions concerned be notified.

Birch Bayh (D) of Indiana, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has acknowledged that in the dilemma between effective intelligence-gathering and the infringement of academic and other freedoms, "fundamental constitutional rights of speech, press, assembly, and privacy are at stake."

On Jan. 30, Iranians and other students at Georgetown demonstrated against CIA personnel sent to university offices to recruit. The demonstrations followed public charges by Prof. Thomas Ricks, an expert on Iran, and John Kelly, of the anti-CIA magazine, Counterspy, that the university had not lived up to public pledges to purge intelligence activities from campus or from its overseas operations.

### 'Lists' read

Mr. Kelly read out lists, which he promised to publish "shortly" in Counterspy, of Georgetown faculty members and lecturers who, he claimed, had been or still were active "CIA officers." He also listed US embassy officers in Tehran, Iran, who he claimed were CIA agents "under cover." Mr. Kelly claimed they had been assigned to the embassy last December to try to salvage the regime of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and prepare, if possible, a military coup to restore him to power.

Counterspy and a related publication, Covert Action, specialize in CIA exposés. Publication in Counterspy of the name of the CIA station chief in Athens, John Welch, was followed by Welch's murder there in December, 1976.

Professor Ricks charged that Georgetown's involvement in the "Ferdowsi project," an ostensibly medical research venture in Mashad, Iran, funded by the Pahlavi Foundation (based on the Shah's private fortune), was an example of improper academic involvement in the world of clandestine political operations abroad.

"The academy," Professor Ricks said, "is an open institution." Scholars "either work with society, or work against its interest." Knowledge gained by research "must, by its very nature, be public knowledge," he added.

### 'Serious threats' charged

Student resolutions at Georgetown, Princeton, Harvard, and elsewhere recently called for an end to covert CIA activities on campus which the Georgetown students said posed "serious threats to the integrity, credibility, and independence of our academic community."

CIA spokesmen insist the agency must maintain relationships with the US academic community, because it needs its expertise. CIA Director Stansfield Turner told Harvard president Derek Bok in a letter last May that he refused to accept Harvard's "guidelines" restricting CIA actions.

Accepting them would make it "impossible" for the agency to do its job, Turner repeated on a CBS "Face the Nation" program last Oct. 28.

The CIA director for administration, John Blake, now retired, in an affidavit in June, responding to a civil suit by a UCLA graduate student, said "identities and affiliation" of campus contacts with the CIA "must be protected" so that relationships would continue. Admiral Turner reaffirmed this principle in a letter to the president of the University of Michigan, Robben W. Fleming, last July 17.

# Academics and the CIA

**L**AST SUNDAY on this page we published a statement by Michel Oksenberg which supported the CIA's position in the case of Nathan Gardels vs. Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Gardels is suing the CIA to obtain information about the agency's covert activities on University of California campuses; he is a graduate student in Political Science. Mr. Oksenberg is a Political Science professor at the University of Michigan on indefinite leave to serve on the National Security Council as a China expert.

In his affidavit Mr. Oksenberg admits having had a confidential relationship with the CIA while he was teaching on campus. Mr. Oksenberg explained that soon after he entered academic life he began to meet CIA officials at scholarly conventions, conferences, and seminars. "I soon found that these CIA officials were professional colleagues of mine; that is, although we did not agree on all matters nor was any pressure placed on me to alter my views, we shared many common interests, we had similar academic backgrounds, we worked with similar unclassified data, and, therefore, we face many similar methodological concerns," he said.

The "cornerstone" of his relationship with the CIA, he said, is strict confidentiality. Mr. Oksenberg said he felt that if the CIA were to reveal not just the names of other professors with similar relationship, and he said there are many, but even the names of institutions where these academics work, it would "destroy the candor and utility of the exchange" — an exchange which he said is beneficial to academics and the national interest.

Mr. Oksenberg said this confidentiality is needed to protect academics from public criticism and scorn which would follow the revelation of such a relationship, because the "CIA is much

maligned and misunderstood on today's campuses.

On the contrary, the CIA is very well understood on college campuses today. Perhaps this is the reason these academics would be subject to public criticism and scorn.

At one point, Mr. Oksenberg defends his relationship with the CIA on the premise that a "free exchange of ideas" is important to his counterparts in the agency and at the university. Certainly no one would deny that the free exchange of ideas is not only the principle on which a university functions, but the foundation of democracy. The CIA, however, seems to be involved in a rather one-sided exchange. Its secrets or cooperation are rendered only to those who would be of service to the agency. Relatively few academics receive the benefits Mr. Oksenberg enjoyed as a result of his secret relationship.

Mr. Oksenberg's statement raises many serious questions as he suspected it would. It is important to bring the discussion of CIA campus activities into the open; in this, he has done a great service to this University community and others. It is unfortunate that his intentions were to preserve a system which smacks of favoritism and has impinged on the civil liberties of those who become victims of the CIA's covert recruiting operation.

In its final report, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities expressed concern "that American academics involved in such activities may undermine public confidence that those who train our youth are upholding the ideals, independence, and integrity of American universities." It would be wise for everyone to consider the Select Committee's concern when pondering the questions raised by Mr. Oksenberg's defense of the CIA.

THE MICHIGAN DAILY

21 January 1979

# In support of the

*Editor's note: What follows this note is an affidavit by Michael Oksenberg submitted in the case of Nathan Gardels vs. Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Oksenberg is a professor at the University of Michigan on indefinite leave to serve on the National Security Council as an advisor on China.*

Mr. Gardels is a graduate student at the University of California where he studies political science. In 1976, after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities revealed that the CIA uses academics at more than 100 American colleges and universities to make "introductions for intelligence purposes" and other tasks, Mr. Gardels submitted to the CIA a Freedom of Information (FOIA) request asking for access to all documents relating to CIA contacts at the University of California, specifically including all contractual arrangements and personnel relationships.

The CIA provided Mr. Gardels with more than 800 documents, some of which revealed that a UC vice president had received CIA training and operated on campus at a covert agent for the Agency. The CIA informed Mr. Gardels that it would neither confirm nor deny the existence of any additional documents which would be responsive to his request and added that if such documents did exist, those documents would be withheld pursuant to section (b) (1) of the FOIA which allows the CIA to protect the identity of its personnel.

Last February Mr. Gardels initiated a lawsuit against the CIA asking the court to order the CIA to produce the requested documents for inspection and copying. The court has not yet reached a decision on the case.

## Affidavit of Michel Oksenberg

Michel Oksenberg, Staff Member, National Security Council Staff, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. I was appointed as a member of the National Security Council Staff on January 20, 1977, and I continue to serve in that position.

2. Prior to joining the National

Security Council Staff, I entered graduate school in 1960 and served since 1966 as a member of the faculties of three major United States universities. I am currently on academic leave from one of these universities, and I intend to teach there once my government service ends.

3. Soon after entering academic life, I began to meet members of the Central Intelligence Agency at various professional meetings: annual conventions of such national associations as the American Political Science Association, academic conferences and seminars, and public meetings. CIA employees openly identified themselves at these meetings; they made no effort to hide their institutional affiliation. I soon found that these CIA officials were professional colleagues of mine; that is, although we did not agree on all matters nor was any pressure placed on me to alter my views, we shared many common interests, we had similar academic backgrounds, we worked with similar unclassified data, and, therefore, we face many similar methodological concerns. As did many other of my university associates, I gradually came to realize that I could have the same kind of professional association with CIA personnel, as well as State and Defense Department officials, that I had with my university colleagues—criticizing one another's papers before publication, corresponding about research problems, and so on. As with my professional exchanges with my academic colleagues, these exchanges were held in confidence by the parties involved. Further, we dealt exclusively with unclassified information.

4. My contacts with Agency personnel were not unusual; many other academics had similar contacts. But I have decided to go on record and to acknowledge publicly this relationship with Agency personnel because I strongly believe

that requiring the disclosure of the names of academics who have similar personal relationships with the Agency would destroy associations both academically and in policy interests of the United States. I have made this decision in full awareness of the fact that the action I am taking will lead to questioning and criticism of my part in these relations, and may in fact adversely affect my future academic career.

5. The free exchange of ideas with counterparts both in and out of academe is one very important way in which academics are able to advance and gauge their intellectual growth and currency once their formal schooling has ended. I benefited greatly from the comments and criticisms that I received from Agency members with whom I shared my work. Similarly, I like to think that some Agency members benefited from my comments on their unclassified papers and thoughts (many of which were subsequently published with CIA authorship acknowledged.) Further, the relations that I developed over the years with our government's foreign policy community were an important factor in my deciding to enter government service for a period, and my effectiveness in the government certainly has been enhanced by the personal contacts that were established during my academic years.

6. The cornerstone of my relations with Agency personnel, as with my other professional colleagues, is that our exchanges are conducted in strict confidence. It is common practice for academics to share their hypotheses, research designs, and writings prior to publication with a substantial number of colleagues on a confidential basis. Any breach of confidentiality would destroy the candor and utility of the exchange. I believe it would be unfortunate if such a breach were to occur. I have confidential professional associations with their

that would not serve our national interest.

7. Confidentiality of correspondence with Agency personnel is also a necessity because the CIA is much maligned and misunderstood on today's campuses. Even the hint of an association with the Agency, including a professional association dealing exclusively with unclassified materials on academic topics, subjects academics to abuse and scorn, and very well may endanger their academic careers. In fact, given the climate on today's campuses, even the disclosure of the fact that such associations exist at a particular university would lead ultimately to strong pressure to identify the academics involved.

8. Therefore, if the Agency is required to disclose any information that would identify, or lead to the identification of academics who have association with the Agency, such associations would be effectively terminated, because those currently involved would be smeared, while young professors would be dissuaded from entering into similar situations. Because I believe that this result is harmful to the academics and their institutions, as well as to the general foreign policy interests of the United States, I would respectfully urge that disclosure of such information not be required.

MICHEL OKSENBERG  
Staff Member

National Security Council  
Washington, D.C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of September, 1978.

SAMMIE L. NEWMAN

Notary Public  
My commission expires:  
March 26, 1980



SEPTEMBER 1978

Center for National Security Studies

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*It is at all times necessary, and more particularly so during the progress of a revolution and until right ideas confirm themselves by habit, that we frequently refresh our patriotism by reference to*

# First Principles.

THOMAS PAINE

## NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

### The CIA on American Campuses: The Harvard Confrontation

By Morton H. Halperin

#### The Church Committee

The original Senate Intelligence Committee (the Church Committee) focused mainly on past abuses of the intelligence agencies. These activities were believed to have ended, and the main problem the Committee considered was enacting legislation to prevent their resumption.

However, in at least one area the committee stumbled upon what it believed to be an on-going set of improper activities. The CIA, the Church Committee learned, had covert relationships with university personnel which, in the view of the committee, posed a threat to academic freedom in the United States.

The section of the Church Committee report on CIA relations with universities, as originally drafted, had three basic parts. One reported the Committee's concern about the situation:

*This article is reprinted from Inquiry Magazine, October 30, 1978.*

*At the same time, the Committee recommends that the CIA amend its internal directives to require that individual academics used for operational purposes by the CIA, together with the President or equivalent official of the relevant academic institutions, be informed of the clandestine CIA relationship.<sup>1</sup>*

A second section described, apparently in some detail, the ongoing on-campus activities of the CIA which gave rise to that concern. However, when the report was submitted to the CIA for approval prior to publication, the agency refused to permit the publication of any details and the report was condensed to these vague paragraphs:

*8. Covert Use of the U.S. Academic Community. The Central Intelligence Agency is now using several hundred American academics, who in addition to providing leads and, on occasion, making introductions for intelligence purposes, occasionally write books and other material to be used for propaganda purposes abroad. Beyond these, an additional few score are used in an unwitting manner for minor activities.*

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HARVARD PRESIDENT DEREK BOK



CIA CHIEF STANSFIELD TURNER

## CIA IN ACADEME

What is the proper role for the Central Intelligence Agency in American universities?

Last summer Derek Bok, president of Harvard, complained to a U.S. Senate committee that the covert recruiting policies of the CIA threatened "the integrity and independence of the academic community."

Bok said Harvard was willing to permit the open recruiting of personnel on campus. But it did not cotton to the CIA practice of covertly using faculty members, athletic coaches, administrators and others to recruit students—particularly foreign students—for the agency's own purposes.

Stansfield Turner, the CIA director appointed by Jimmy Carter, says he has no intentions of complying with Harvard's ban on the recruiting of foreign students.

"If we were required to abide by the rules of every corporation, every academic institution, it would become impossible to do the required job for our country," Turner explained to a group of TV interviewers. "Harvard does not have any legal authority over us. I think it's very dangerous for our country when a particular segment of our society—in this case, the intelligence community—is singled out for discriminatory action."

The trouble with the covert intervention of the CIA in the life of a university is that it breeds distrust and suspicion. Unfortunately, the CIA suffers from a tarnished history of rank dishonor, inept leadership and consistent violation of the law. It should not be permitted to insinuate itself into the academic community without Congressional guidelines.

# Turner and the CIA

## fight back

### *Universities move to block covert activities on campus*

By René Becker

**W**HEN THE Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner invited University President Robben Fleming, along with as yet an undisclosed number of other college presidents, to come to CIA headquarters last June, he had one goal in mind—stop the University from adopting guidelines which would restrict the Agency's covert activities on campus.

The University of Michigan is just one of more than 40 colleges which have either adopted or are considering guidelines that would prohibit government intelligence agencies such as the CIA from using professors, administrators, or anyone else as a covert agent on campus.

The June meeting at the Agency headquarters in Langley, Virginia, which Fleming was unable to attend due to a conflict in his schedule, was the second in a series of three day-long seminars wherein the "common interests" of the CIA and academics were discussed.

It is generally believed the purpose of these seminars is to protect what is perhaps the CIA's most sensitive domestic program—the recruitment of foreign nationals on American college campuses for the Agency's clandestine service.

In a heavily CIA-censored section of the final report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, the Agency admitted to "using several hundred American academics (administrators, faculty members, and graduate students engaged in teaching), who in addition to providing leads and sometimes making introductions for intelligence purposes, occasionally write books and other material to be used for propaganda purpose abroad."

The report went on to state that these academics are located on more than 100 American colleges, universities, and related institutes and that generally no one, besides the individuals involved, is aware that a CIA link exists.

Of particular interest to the CIA was, according to the report, obtaining leads on "political foreign intelligent sources, especially those from communist countries." The Committee noted that American academics provide "valuable assistance" in making those contacts.

The Intelligence Committee's report sparked two reactions. In addition to the thousands of requests for personal files under the newly expanded Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the CIA received requests for all files within the Agency indexed under the titles of more than 80 colleges. Also, a number of universities began to discuss adopting guidelines which would prevent the type of covert activities outlined in the Senate report.

The trendsetter in this case was Harvard University. In May, 1977, Harvard became the first American university to adopt guidelines.

As with Harvard, the key to all guidelines—either adopted or considered, is the prohibition of covert recruiting—an activity the University of Michigan Civil Liberties Board has called "a particularly pernicious practice."

The CIA's covert recruitment program came to light through one of those thousands of FOIA requests submitted after the Senate Select Committee hearings.

Gary Weissman was a student at the University of Wisconsin in the late 1950s. He served as president of the Wisconsin Student Association in 1959 and after graduation was mildly active in the anti-Vietnam war movement.

Weissman learned recently that he was the subject of a five-year CIA investigation to determine his eligibility for the Agency's clandestine service. The Agency considered using Weissman as a covert CIA agent at the Seventh World Youth Festival in Vienna in 1959.

The most noteworthy aspect of this investigation is the fact that Weissman never applied for CIA employment and that he was not aware that he was being investigated. Weissman was never contacted by the CIA.

**B**UT AS THE CIA released more and more documents, the revelations became more and more spectacular. As a result of an FOIA request by Nathan Gardels, a University of California graduate student in political science, the CIA released documents which proved that former UC Vice-President Earl Bolton served a tour of duty with the CIA when he was an administrator at the university system.

The documents revealed that Bolton advised the CIA on student unrest, recruiting UC students, academic cover for professors doing research for the CIA, and improving the Agency's public image on campus.

Despite these revelations, the CIA would not release any evidence which confirmed the much touted theory that the CIA used its campus contacts to recruit foreign nationals for its clandestine service.

The schools with large foreign student enrollments, where it would

CONTINUED

TO BE PRESENTED TO FACULTY FOR VOTE

# SACUA drafts 'U' intelligence agency guidelines

By LEONARD BERNSTEIN

The University's attempt to formulate policy covering its relationship with domestic and foreign intelligence agencies faces crucial test at this month's Faculty Senate Assembly meeting on Dec. 18.

The Senate Advisory Committee for University Affairs (SACUA) yesterday placed the most recent draft of the controversial guidelines, formulated last week by the Civil Liberties Board (CLB), on the agenda for the faculty body's next monthly meeting.

THE LATEST CLB draft, which will be brought before the Assembly for discussion and a vote without appraisal from SACUA, represents the culmination of a year's discussion on the issue from faculty, administration, and student sources.

The latest draft, dated Nov. 29, differs somewhat in principle and language from the Sept. 27 draft the CLB had presented to SACUA. According to SACUA Chairman Shaw Livermore, those differences represent responses by the CLB to suggestions made by University Vice-President for Academic Affairs Harold Shapiro.

The most significant changes involved the attempts to apply specific rules governing activities by intelligence agencies as opposed to other organizations.

THE CURRENT DRAFT states "no member of the University community should assist any person or organization, including intelligence agencies, in obtaining the involuntary services of another member of the University community." The Sept. 27 draft of this resolution applied only to intelligence agencies.

But the CLB retained language singling out intelligence agencies in the principle regarding recruitment at the University.

The guidelines still state: "No member of the University community should give the name of another member of the University community to any intelligence agency for the purpose of possible recruitment by the intelligence agency without the express prior consent of that individual..."

THE BOARD ADDED the phrase "unless required to do so by law or subpoena" at the end of this clause.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has long objected to University attempts to use specific rules with recruitment by intelligence agencies. In a July 17 of this year letter to University President Robben Fleming, CIA

Director Admiral Stansfield Turner wrote: "It does seem to me both inequitable and a potential disservice to the country to apply to inquiries from this Agency rules of procedure that do not apply to other applicants for personnel information or recommendations."

But SACUA member Margaret Leary, who also sits on the Civil Liberties Board, explained the decision to retain the original wording of this clause was due to "the superior secret investigative machinery that intelligence agencies have."

THE TWO OTHER resolves of the current document state members of the University should not:

- "lend their names and positions to gain public acceptance for material they know to be misleading or untrue," or
- "use their academic role as a ruse for obtaining information for intelligence agencies."

The guidelines also state that "adjudication of alleged violations will be the responsibility of University bodies and officials and governed by existing

rules and regulations."

The Dec. 18 meeting will mark the second time the Faculty Senate Assembly has reviewed a policy proposal on intelligence agencies in the last year. The 70 member group rejected a proposal last May because of numerous objections by faculty members. The guidelines were sent back to the CLB for reworking at that time.

OBSERVERS WERE unable to predict the chances of the current document receiving approval by the Assembly this time. However, most seemed optimistic that, after discussions of wording and content, a vote would be taken on the principles in the document.

SACUA member Jesse Gordon, and professor of Social Work and Psychology, said he was "rather strongly" in favor of the document, though he did want to suggest some changes. Gordon agreed with opponents that the guidelines are an encroachment of academic freedom, but he said he thought they are "an appropriate one."

"Academic freedoms can only cover honorable activities," he said.

BUT ENGINEERING Prof. Arch Naylor, another SACUA member, said he would probably vote against the guidelines when the Assembly meets.

Naylor stressed that he had not thoroughly read the present draft and that "there certainly have been modifications in the direction I would like to see it modified," but maintained that "I'll have to be convinced we really need such a document."

NAYLOR ALSO said he was unsure the guidelines would be effective and that he was apprehensive about "rules on things faculty are not allowed to do" which include "an implied punishment mechanism."

Should the guidelines be approved by the Assembly, they must then be recommended to the Regents by the administration. The Regents must then approve the guidelines for them to become University policy.

SACUA Chairman and history Prof. Shaw Livermore, who has acted as intermediary between the CLB and the administration for much of the discussion on the guidelines, was optimistic about the possibility of such a recommendation. "I think they (the chances) are good," Livermore said.

# Letters to the Daily

## Turner: the CIA is not out of control

To the Daily:

In your 24 October 1978 editorial, "The CIA on Campus," you contend that "no one seems to have authority over the CIA," that the CIA has "too long been permitted to continue their surreptitious activities outside the sphere of civilian control" and "that the agency has gotten out of control is apparent." This assertion is incorrect both historically and as regards CIA activities today.

The Senate Select Committee, chaired by Senator Church stated in Book I of its final report, "The CIA has come to be viewed as an unfettered monolith, defining and determining its activities independent of other elements of government and of the direction of American foreign policy. This is a distortion. During its twenty-nine year history, the Agency has been shaped by the course of international events, by pressures from other government agencies, and by its own internal norms. An exhaustive history of the CIA would demand an equally exhaustive history of American foreign policy, the role of Congress and the Executive, the other components on the Intelligence Community, and an examination of the interaction among all these forces."

Although never released to the public, the report of the House Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) was reported in Village Voice to have arrived at even more categorical conclusion concerning the control of the CIA: "All evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control, has been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for Security Affairs."

After the first session of the 95th Congress came to a close,

Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, reported to the Senate that, "There is no question that a number of abuses of power, mistakes in judgment, and failures by the intelligence agencies have harmed the United States. In almost every instance, the abuses that have been revealed were a result of direction from above, including Presidents and Secretaries of State. Further, in almost every instance, some members of both Houses of Congress assigned the duty of oversight were knowledgeable about these activities."

Today, the President's Executive Order 12036, signed January 24, 1978 (copy enclosed) lays out specific directions for carrying out intelligence activities, restrictions on those activities, and creates several new mechanisms for oversight.

In the Executive Branch, the new Intelligence Oversight Board, composed of three distinguished civilians from outside the government, are directed to investigate all allegations of illegal or improper intelligence activity. Anyone may communicate directly with that Board. Their findings go directly to the President.

In the Legislative Branch, a select committee on intelligence exists in both the Senate and the House. They are kept fully informed of intelligence activities and, in turn, exercise genuine control over all such activities. There is no question in my mind or in the mind of anyone in the Intelligence Community that we are held accountable for what we do.

These two Congressional committees are now in the process of drafting charters which will

codify in federal law the various restrictions and limitations as well as the missions of the Intelligence Community. I fully and actively support that endeavor.

Consequently, rather than being out of control as you allege, the United States Intelligence Community, and specifically the CIA, are under the tightest internal and external controls of their history.

Further, you find my refusal to comply with Harvard's faculty guidelines peremptory and outrageous. In fact, it is neither. The CIA and Harvard have been engaged in a productive dialogue for over a year. During that time the majority of our differences have been reconciled. There remain but three points of differences:

1. The Harvard guidelines require that relationships between Harvard faculty members and the CIA be reported to the Harvard administration.

CIA has no objection to this requirement but believes it is the prerogative of the faculty member to reveal those relationships which are external to his faculty responsibilities, not the CIA. CIA considers all such relationships private and personal. The faculty member may deal with them in any way he chooses.

2. That only relationships with intelligence agencies are required to be so revealed.

While the guidelines you propose in your subsequent editorial, "The University Guidelines" on 29 October 1978, recognizes the diverse opportunities for conflict of interest which are present on all campuses, e.g., consulting arrangements with businesses, private publication opportunities, part-time jobs, etc., Harvard's guidelines do not. It seems naive to me to assume that only a

relationship with an intelligence agency has the potential for conflict or for infringing on academic or personal freedom. Additionally, this requirement infers that all other relationships are preferable to one with the U.S. Government. This is neither sound logic nor realistic. If this guideline were extended to cover all business or professional relationships external to the faculty member's university responsibilities, CIA would have no objection.

3. The CIA should not establish any confidential relationship with faculty members for the possible purpose of assessing or contacting foreign students.

Again, in light of the thousands of confidential recommendations prepared annually by faculty members for students applying to businesses, graduate schools, and other government agencies, a guideline prohibiting the same kind of recommendation to the Intelligence Community is inconsistent with recognized and accepted faculty practice. No student at a university is totally free of confidential appraisal in one form or another; none of us is either in school or at work. If a particular student's qualifications result in a specific work or study proposal by a business, another university, or a government agency, and the student is not interested, the student is free to decline the proposal. It is difficult to see how this abridges anyone's freedom.

I am enclosing a copy of the CIA's internal regulation governing our relationship with academic institutions and a statement I made at the University of Kentucky which describes those relationships and the oversight process in greater detail.

—Stansfield Turner  
Director of Central Intelligence



CHAMPAIGN DAILY ILLINI (ILL.)  
1 December 1978

# UI officials' feelings mixed on controlling spy activity

by Jim Dray

Although the University now has no guidelines on cooperation with the CIA and other federal intelligence groups, administrators have expressed mixed reactions to establishing such rules.

The CIA has admitted various types of activity on college campuses in general, including using professors as contacts with foreign countries. In the 1950s, research projects such as LSD testing occurred at the University.

In order to control the activity of intelligence groups, Harvard and several other universities have proposed guidelines which place strict limits on interaction with faculty members.

However, University President John E. Corbally said he thought the Harvard guidelines "pick out the CIA as a special case" and "impose rules on relations that wouldn't ordinarily be restricted."

Harvard's guidelines still basically allow research contracts and other relationships with the CIA, but require much information to be made public and other relationships to be approved by the president of the university.

CIA director Stansfield Turner has said that he doesn't intend to follow Harvard's guidelines, asserting that relationships with faculty

being  
watched



are not "so inherently suspect as to require (them) to be publicly acknowledged and made subject to scrutiny."

Corbally said that the University's reporting system has already been improved so that a project like the LSD research could not remain confidential for more than 20 years as the MK-ULTRA project at the University did.

But Edwin Goldwasser, vice-chancellor for research, said he would be sympathetic to the establishment of guidelines for intelligence involvement. Goldwasser was formerly deputy director of the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in Batavia, a internationally known—and used—laboratory for the study of subnuclear physics. He noted that the CIA had often approached him both as a University professor and at the Fermi lab.

"For a number of years when I was on this campus—before I went to the Fermi lab—I felt uneasy about these debriefings, (where

the CIA interviews professors after contact with foreign countries)... I couldn't say why, because nothing I said was improper. It just didn't seem right to me.

"Finally at Fermi lab I identified what I felt was wrong about it, and it has to do with these two different functions of the government."

"If I'm continually being questioned by the CIA about what I've learned or whatever, I think that I may jeopardize my relationship with those people (foreign scientists)... If suddenly they should happen to find out that through some back door that I'm telling everything that they talk to me about to the CIA, it kind of undermines the possibility of developing this kind of relationship."

Chancellor William P. Gerberding said that although he did not disagree with the goals of the Harvard statement, he thought there would be little opportunity to use them on the campus, noting improved reporting of research contracts.

"One gets close here to political and/or ethical questions," Gerberding said, "that are difficult to legislate about and maybe not even the proper area for legislation or policy statements."

THE DAILY ILLINI (CHAMPAIGN, ILL.)  
1 DECEMBER 1978

# editorial

## FBI, CIA bugging University

When academic issues are discussed, many people complain that the University too often mimics the policies of schools like Harvard. But in the case of setting guidelines for federal intelligence activity on campus, the University would do well to follow Harvard's lead.

Harvard's President Derek Bok recently established a set of guidelines applying to U.S. intelligence groups which put strict limits on the groups' activities on campus. The guidelines basically maintain that most discussions with or research for intelligence agencies should be allowed, but that such interaction must be made public.

Harvard's attempt to maintain the sanctity of academia is laudable.

Although most people don't usually think about the CIA being on campus, it is. The agency interviews professors after trips abroad, observes visiting scholars from other countries and asks professors to act as the CIA's "eyes" while they're abroad.

In the past, it has also sponsored clandestine research projects at this university and others. Most outstanding of those is the LSD research it sponsored at the University in the 1950s.

Neither the CIA nor the FBI belongs on campus, the same as neither should be spying on students and other U.S. citizens. Yet they do.

Allen McCreight, chief of the FBI's Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts Branch explains it's the FBI's duty, and it can't make everybody happy.

The University Board of Trustees should enact a strong policy statement against intelligence agency involvement to make it very clear that it's not happy with such intervention.

Although University President John E. Corbally contends Harvard's guidelines unfairly limit on the CIA's activities alone, a modified version solving that problem could surely be produced.

Such CIA activity also has ramifications contrary to world peace because it hampers international scientific cooperation.

Edwin Goldwasser, vice chancellor for research, said that both as a professor and as deputy director of the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, CIA agents often asked him to explain what he learned abroad or from foreign scientists here. He added that the CIA may be jeopardizing his relationship with a foreign scientist by doing so.

But CIA director Stansfield Turner has indicated he doesn't intend to follow the Harvard guidelines because he considers covert interaction between the CIA and academia a "right." It remains to be seen whether he will be successful in subverting Harvard's wishes.

Whether it appears that the CIA is heavily involved on campus, or even whether the agency would obey the wishes of academia, a strong statement against secret interaction with intelligence agencies would be a laudable symbolic move. It would also be a strong moral one emphasizing the goals of a free academia and unshackled personal freedom.



# Administrators see no need for CIA guidelines here

By JOHN McMILLAN  
 Daily Texan Staff

Although several American universities may soon be following the lead of Harvard in establishing guidelines to limit involvement with the Central Intelligence Agency, University administrators say there are no plans to follow suit here.

William Hays, vice president for academic affairs, said present broad guidelines on outside activity allow for supervision of relationships with the agency. "We expect each person to report any of his outside employment activities," Hays said Wednesday.

"I think I would be against any sort of covert activities — for the CIA or anybody else," he added.

ERNEST SMERDON, System vice chancellor for academic affairs, said he was unaware of discussion at any System institution concerning restrictions on CIA activity.

"We really don't have much of a problem here," William Livingston, professor of government, said, adding that the issue has not been discussed for several years in the Faculty Senate, of which he is chairman.

Livingston speculated that CIA involvement with the University is much less than at schools such as Harvard, which in May 1977 became the first university to establish guidelines limiting CIA campus activity.

SINCE THEN, Ohio State and Syracuse Universities have adopted policies on CIA activity, and a spokesman for the Senate Intelligence Committee said approximately 40 universities are moving toward similar restrictions.

Although the University's Applied Research Laboratories conduct classified research for the Pentagon, they have never received money from the CIA, said George Strandtmann, ARL assistant director for administration.

Bobby McQuiston, assistant director of the office of sponsored projects, said he was unaware of any contracts between the University and the CIA, and William Wood, regional CIA recruiter, said no University faculty members are employed by the agency.

Wood, who was on campus Wednesday interviewing engineering students, said

all recruitment of University students is conducted openly. "Some of the people that we hire may go into clandestine service," he added.

THE CIA hires between 15 and 20 University students annually, Wood said, adding that the agency is primarily interested in technically oriented students and liberal arts graduate students who speak exotic foreign languages.

In 1976, the Senate Intelligence Committee reported that "several hundred" academics — students, faculty and administrators — were serving the agency by providing information and writing books that could be used abroad as propaganda, a committee spokesman said.

Congress has been considering the relationship between universities and the CIA in the context of proposed legislation revising the charters of national security agencies, the spokesman said.

THE EFFECTIVENESS of university measures designed to curtail CIA activity came into question in late October, when CIA Director Stansfield Turner asserted that his agency would ignore Harvard University's ban on covert recruiting of foreign students as CIA agents.

Harvard's guidelines, which carry no punitive measures for violations, include a prohibition on all covert CIA recruitment at the school.

Faculty members employed as consultants for the agency must report their activity to the administration, and direct operational use of academics is prohibited, a Harvard spokesman said.

The guidelines also ask that the CIA obtain the consent of academics it uses.

Dale Peterson, public affairs officer at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., said Harvard's requirement that academics report CIA employment was an infringement of their rights. •

FORCING FACULTY members to report their work for the agency would effectively dry up sources of information, he said.

"We have cut back covert activities (on campuses) to only the most essential," Peterson said, adding that his agency is "very conscious" of universities' concerns.

In all cases, the CIA follows the law, Peterson said.

President Jimmy Carter in January issued an executive order containing guidelines for the intelligence community, but the CIA's relationship to universities was not specifically mentioned, Peterson said.

Article appeared  
on page A-3

THE WASHINGTON POST  
27 November 1978

# PostScript



## EXCERPT:

A former University of California official has been given the 1978 Doublespeak Award by the National Council of Teachers in English for a memo he wrote for the CIA in 1968.

Earl Clinton Bolton took the honor for a recently declassified memo entitled "Agency-Academic Relations." The panel said the memo suggested that those in academia assisting the CIA may be on the defensive, but advises them to explain their CIA involvement "as a contribution to proper academic goals."

The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20505

14 November 1978

The Editor  
Michigan Daily  
University of Michigan  
420 Maynard Street  
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48107

Dear Sir:

In your 24 October 1978 editorial, "The CIA on Campus," you contend that "no one seems to have authority over the CIA," that the CIA has "too long been permitted to continue their surreptitious activities outside the sphere of civilian control" and "that the agency has gotten out of control is apparent." This assertion is incorrect both historically and as regards CIA activities today.

The Senate Select Committee chaired by Senator Church stated in Book I of its final report, "The CIA has come to be viewed as an unfettered monolith, defining and determining its activities independent of other elements of government and of the direction of American foreign policy. This is a distortion. During its twenty-nine year history, the Agency has been shaped by the course of international events, by pressures from other government agencies, and by its own internal norms. An exhaustive history of the CIA would demand an equally exhaustive history of American foreign policy, the role of Congress and the Executive, the other components of the Intelligence Community, and an examination of the interaction among all these forces."

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 15

NEW TIMES  
13 NOVEMBER 1978

# THE INSIDER

STAT

## REMEDIAL SPYING

### CIA HOLDS CRASH COURSE FOR COLLEGE PRESIDENTS

The CIA, under pressure to stop its admitted widespread covert activities on American college campuses, has initiated a series of seminars to woo leading university administrators. In the past nine months, seven university presidents have visited CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. for day-long briefings, according to CIA spokesman Dale Peterson, "to talk about our many common interests."

This latest goodwill gesture comes in the wake of a flood of requests from some 80 universities for agency files concerning clandestine recruitment of students and faculty by CIA operatives. Admitting only to the covert recruiting of foreign students on American campuses, Agency Director Admiral Stansfield Turner has openly refused to give any assurance that he will comply with strict guidelines proposed by Harvard University President Derek Bok to limit the Agency's campus activities.

The CIA's uncooperative attitude has irritated Bok and other academic leaders, but the Agency is encouraged by attendance at the seminars which took place in March and June of this year. Agency spokesman Peterson says such topics as clandestine activities on campus, university-agency relations and research were discussed at the two

meetings. They're [the college presidents] doing it because they see some mutual benefit."



Turner: There's no limit

turned out very beneficial so far. That's why we're proceeding and are planning to have some more."

Peterson refused to give us the names of the presidents who attended, insisting that to do so would be "an invasion of their privacy." Meanwhile, the Center for National Security Studies has filed a Freedom of Information request to find out more about the college presidents and the secret Langley pow-wows.

—Joel Kolkin and  
Dorothy Samuels

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USE ONLY☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ SECRET

STAT

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

STAT

SUBJECT: (Optional) Article headed, "Priest, College President, Citizen of the World,"  
Chicago Tribune Magazine, 12 November 1978

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

16 November 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. [ ] Office of  
Special Assistant to the  
DCI for Public Affairs

PLP

2. Cuddy -  
3. (except)

Attached article on The Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, President, Notre Dame is provided FYI. Note the reference to CIA on the last page. Father Hesburgh is one of the US university presidents who will be invited to meet with the DCI at some time in the near future.

STAT

Attachment: As stated

PRH:pd

2 November 1978

# Administrators see no need CIA guidelines here

By JOHN McMILLAN  
Daily Texan Staff

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*'We have cut back covert activities (on campuses) to only the most essential'—CIA official*

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President Jimmy Carter in January issued an executive order containing guidelines for the intelligence community, but the CIA's relationship to universities was not specifically mentioned, Peterson said.

THE MICHIGAN DAILY  
29 October 1978

# The University guidelines

THIS WEEK the Senate Advisory Committee on University Affairs (SACUA) reviewed a set of proposed guidelines concerning relationships between members of the University community and U.S. intelligence agencies. The proposed guidelines were not well received.

Some SACUA members said the guidelines restricted academic freedom; others said they were not broad enough. The issues of personal and academic freedom raise many questions when discussed in the context of covert CIA and FBI activities. The questions are equally difficult when discussing corporate scrounging of universities for potential employees. Guidelines which check the activities of intelligence agencies and corporations in the University community are sorely needed to protect both the academic and personal freedom of everyone. Therefore we endorse the following guidelines based largely on a set adopted last year by Harvard University.

- Individual members of the University community may enter into direct or indirect consulting arrangements for intelligence agencies and corporations to provide research and analytical services. The individual must report in writing the existence of such an arrangement to the dean of her or his faculty, who then must inform the president of the University.

- Any member of the University community who has an ongoing relationship with an intelligence agency and/or corporation as a recruiter must report that fact in writing to the dean of the appropriate faculty, who must inform the president of the University and the appropriate placement offices within the

University. A recruiter must not give the name of another member of the University community without the prior consent of that individual. Members of the University community whose advice is sought on a one-time or occasional basis should follow the same procedure.

- Members of the University community must not undertake intelligence operations for intelligence agencies. They must not participate in propaganda activities if the activities involve lending their names and positions to gain public acceptance for materials they know to be misleading or untrue. Before undertaking any other propaganda activities, an individual should consider whether the task is consistent with her or his scholarly and professional obligations.

- No member of the University community should assist an intelligence agency or a corporation in obtaining the unwitting service of another member of the University community. Intelligence agencies or corporations should not employ members of the University community in an unwitting manner.

We were chagrined to learn last week that CIA Director Stansfield Turner will continue to refuse to obey the Harvard guidelines. The director's refusal, however, should not deter the faculty Senate Assembly from adopting these guidelines. In fact, it should convince the faculty that guidelines for the University community are an absolute necessity. Adoption of the proposed guidelines would send a clear and strong message to President Carter, who is ultimately responsible for intelligence operations, that the intelligence agencies are irresponsible and should be forced to heed the rights of American citizens and visitors to this country.



THE MICHIGAN DAILY  
24 October 1978

## The CIA on campus

EARLIER THIS year, Harvard University took a bold stand against government spying when it banned covert recruiting of foreign students as CIA agents. Sunday, that progressive step was nullified by CIA director Stansfield Turner's peremptory announcement that his agency would not comply with the Harvard guidelines.

"If we're required to abide by the rules of every corporation, every academic institution, it would become impossible to do the required job for our country," he said, and added, "Harvard does not have any legal authority over us."

Therein lies the problem; no one seems to have authority over the CIA. These myopic chauvinists have too long been permitted to continue their surreptitious activities outside the sphere of civilian control. This summer, Congress approved the agency's budget without even knowing how much it was.

The terms "national security" and "for the good of the country" are liberally fed to the media by Mr. Turner and his cohorts, but these can hardly be justification for the gross malfeasance of the CIA: fighting the MPLA in Angola; aiding in the overthrow of the Allende

government; its role in Santa Domingo, and probably countless other immoral acts yet to be revealed.

That Harvard sought to sever its ties with the corruption and stench of the international espionage network is more than commendable, it is the only moral stance one p to any institution, and one we have encouraged the University to take. That the independent nature of the CIA permits Mr. Turner to ignore Harvard's ban is an outrage. College campuses, our pillars of intellectualism, must not be used as tools by a notorious band of international mercenaries, thieves, assassins and spies.

That the agency has gotten out of control is apparent. What is not clear is how to alleviate the problem. Since Mr. Turner is unmoved by protests or even official requests by universities; it is time for President Carter and Congress to force the director to pay heed to decency and morality — something that should have been done long ago.

The president and Congress should no longer give the CIA license to continue its repugnant and pernicious exploits on American college campuses and around the world.

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ON PAGE A -25

THE WASHINGTON POST  
23 October 1978

## Covert Enlistments Will Continue

# CIA Ignores Harvard's Recruiting Curb

Associated Press

CIA Director Stansfield Turner said yesterday he will not comply with a Harvard University ban on covert recruiting of foreign students as CIA agents.

"If we were required to abide by the rules of every corporation, every academic institution, it would become impossible to do the required job for our country," Turner said. "Harvard does not have any legal authority over us."

In response to a direct question, Turner said the Central Intelligence Agency would ignore the university's restriction.

Harvard President Derek C. Bok complained to a Senate committee last summer that the CIA covert recruiting threatens "the integrity and independence of the academic community."

He said Harvard was willing to allow the CIA to recruit personnel openly on the campus. But he said the CIA was using faculty members, administrators and students to recruit others—especially foreign students—and to collect information useful in its own operation.

Yesterday on "Face the Nation" (CBS, WDVN) Turner said that corpo-



STANSFIELD TURNER

... sees no "authority over us."

rations also engage in covert recruiting and added, "I think it's very dangerous for our country when a particular segment of our society—in this case the intelligence community—is singled out for discriminatory action."

On other subjects, Turner said:

- There are "very good prospects" to achieve an arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union, but the talks are too delicate to relax in confidence.

- The CIA has reviewed and in some cases tightened its security procedures in the wake of the alleged sale to the Soviets of a spy satellite manual by an agency employee. However, he said, overall security precautions at the time of the incident were judged to be satisfactory and the intelligence agency by its nature cannot overly restrict access to classified material by its own staff.

- He has no knowledge of a high-level foreign agent within the CIA, as has been rumored, but "for me to sit here and tell you confidently that there is none would be foolish." He said the agency is constantly looking for leaks from within.

- He has no solution to the dilemma of whether to put foreign spies on trial, where classified material would become public evidence, or to let them go free in order to protect the information. "That's part of our judicial process in this country, and in each case we have to weigh the value and the risk" of revealing the classified information, he said.

DIAMOND BACK  
(UNIV. OF MD.)  
28 September 1978

# Ollman protest continues

## Faculty resumes demanded

by David Boul

About 15 members of the campus Committee for Academic Freedom protested in front of Tydings hall yesterday in their continued support of Marxist Bertell Ollman.

Chanting slogans and carrying signs demanding that Ollman be hired as chairman of the government and politics department; the demonstrators attracted little attention from passersby.

Last July, University President John S. Toll rejected Ollman for the post, claiming Ollman was unqualified for the job. Ollman had been approved by campus

administrators and was offered the job in writing.

After protesting in front of the building for an hour, the students then went to the government department office and demanded to see the resumes of several professors.

According to Michelle Asher, one of the demonstrators, she had been denied access to the resumes by department staff consistently for the past two weeks. Asher said the resumes are public information.

However, when the protesters arrived at the department office, Kathleen L. Klein, a secretary in the department, allowed three of the students to examine but not photocopy the documents. Klein said Murray Polakoff, behavioral and social sciences division provost, had given them permission to examine the documents.

After studying the resumes, Asher said some research grants received by several professors presented a conflict of interest with their teaching duties.

According to his resume, Warren Phillips, a professor in

the department, received a \$250,000 grant from the Central Intelligence Agency to study "The Political Implications of Research Dynamics."

Asher called that grant "not exactly conducive to unbiased education."

Some supporters of Ollman have charged he was denied the chairmanship here because of his radical political views. However, Toll insists he made his decision solely on the qualifications of the candidate.

Asher said it is unfair to criticize Ollman for being a

Marxist in light of the political affiliations of other department members. "If you want to condemn Ollman for his beliefs, then you also have to condemn these other people who have beliefs in the opposite direction," she said.

Guy B. Hathorn, acting department chairman, said it is "extremely unfair" to judge either the content or the subject of any research grant merely by looking at its title.

Phillips was out of town and could not be reached for comment.

SACRAMENTO BEE  
19 September 1978

## The CIA And The Professors

It's hardly a secret that, for more than a generation, the Central Intelligence Agency has maintained more than a casual relationship with hundreds of teachers and researchers on scores of university campuses throughout the United States. In some instances, faculty members have been employed as consultants or researchers; in others, they have been commissioned to gather intelligence in foreign countries during the course of their academically supported travel. In still others, professors have been employed to identify and recruit American and foreign students on U.S. campuses.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is now considering legislation that would, among other things, restrict the CIA's campus activities by preventing the use of American citizens for covert operational assistance abroad if their travel is supported or sponsored by an academic institution. It would also prevent the agency from covertly placing its employees in colleges and universities. The bill would not, however, restrict the agency from covertly recruiting agents from students on U.S. campuses, a practice which the agency acknowledged is continuing.

The CIA has criticized the bill as too restrictive. More recently, representatives of the academic community, including the general secretary of the American Association of University Professors, and Derek Bok, the president of Harvard, have attacked it as too permissive. Among other things, Bok wants the CIA to agree to make all contracts with universities public and to stop all covert operations involving academics.

The reasons for that concern are clear. If

there is a suspicion that there are covert agents on campus, the trust that is the very foundation of an academic community — trust in the objectivity of teaching and research — is undermined. Yet there are limits on the extent to which those restrictions can be effectively put into law. Prohibiting covert operations may be as difficult as outlawing impure thoughts.

There is no question that the government should make every effort to restrict covert CIA activities not only on campuses, but among the press and in other areas of domestic life. At the same time, the academic community shares that responsibility. Universities can make it clear that faculty members who engage in covert activity for any outside agency — government or private — violate their academic commitments and the ethics of their profession. Similarly, the AAUP, which is the leading professional association of university teachers, can make it clear that it will support the censure and, in cases of flagrant abuse, the dismissal of any faculty member who uses his academic post as a cover for secret intelligence work or other covert activities.

The CIA has a legitimate mandate to gather and analyze foreign intelligence; the very breadth of that mandate requires restraint: self-restraint on the part of the agency, legislative restraint where it can be effectively imposed, and restraint on the part of academics or others in positions of trust. If the academic community made its position clear on those matters, all parties would better understand the limits of potentially compromising relationships, and the academic community would find it far easier to trust itself.

MICHIGAN DAILY  
12 September 1978

# CIA chief Turner objects to University recruiting restraints

By LEONARD BERNSTEIN

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Admiral Stansfield Turner voiced objections to proposed University guidelines governing CIA recruitment of employees on campus in a letter to University President Robben Fleming this summer.

The guidelines were a draft of proposed regulations formulated by the University Civil Liberties Board last year.

TURNER'S primary concern centered around a clause in the guidelines requiring "intelligence agencies such as the CIA" to obtain "the express prior consent of an individual" before "his or her name may be submitted by another member of the University community to an intelligence agency as a potential employee, consultant, or agent."

In a letter dated July 17, Turner requested that the recruitment efforts of the CIA be treated like those of private employers and added: "Nevertheless, I want you to know that this agency has no objection to the rule on personnel inquiries that is proposed, provided it is applied equally to all such inquiries. It does seem to me both inequitable and a potential disservice to the country to apply to inquiries from this agency rules of procedure that do not apply to other applicants for personnel information or

recommendations."

The proposed guidelines went before the faculty Senate Assembly for discussion last June. Assembly objections sent the document back to the board for revisions, which will be made beginning this month.

THE GUIDELINES are a response to disclosures that the CIA has covertly recruited employees and conducted

*"It does seem to me both inequitable and a potential disservice to the country to apply to inquiries from this agency rules of procedure that do not apply to other applicants for personnel information or recommendations."*

*—CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner*

experiments at the University and at other institutions.

Turner further endeavored to reassure Fleming about CIA recruitment of foreign students. Turner guaranteed that no "intimidating or

coercive" practices were used with foreign students and noted that "beyond steps designed to identify individuals of possible interest to us, it is not our practice to pursue personnel inquiries without informing the objects of those inquiries of our interest."

But Turner also mentioned that he failed "to see why they (foreign students) should not be granted the same freedom of choice with regard to their own futures that American students enjoy."

PRESIDENT Fleming, who did not respond to the Turner letter, has adopted a noncommittal attitude toward the guidelines.

"I believe there should be some guidelines," Fleming said yesterday. But he refused to suggest any specifics until "they (the Senate Assembly) get something they agree upon."

The translation of Civil Liberties Board proposals into University policy is expected to be a long process. Board recommendations must be reviewed by the Senate Advisory Committee for University Affairs (SACUA), the Senate Assembly and the University Executive Officers (president and vice-presidents) before the Regents consider adopting them as policy.

The Civil Liberties Board is comprised of faculty, students and administrators.

MODESTO BEE (CA.)  
12 September 1978

# The CIA On Campus

It's hardly secret that, for more than a generation, the Central Intelligence Agency has maintained more than a casual relationship with hundreds of teachers and researchers on scores of university campuses throughout the United States. In some instances, faculty members have been employed as consultants or researchers; in others they have been commissioned to gather intelligence in foreign countries during the course of their academically-supported travel. In still others, professors have been employed to identify and recruit American and foreign students on U.S. campuses.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is now considering legislation that would, among other things, restrict the CIA's campus activities by preventing the use of American citizens for covert operational assistance abroad if their travel is supported or sponsored by an academic institution. It would also prevent the agency from covertly placing its employees in colleges and universities. The bill would not, however, restrict the agency from covertly recruiting agents from students on U.S. campuses, a practice which the agency acknowledged is continuing.

The CIA has criticized the bill as too restrictive. More recently, representatives of the academic community, including the general secretary of the American Association of University Professors and Derek Bok, the president of Harvard, attacked it as too permissive. Among other things, Bok wants the CIA to agree to make all contracts with universities public and to stop all covert operations involving academics.

The reasons for that concern are clear. If there is

suspicion that there are covert agents on campus, the trust that is the very foundation of an academic community — trust in the objectivity of teaching and research — is undermined. Yet there are limits on the extent to which those restrictions can be effectively put into law. Prohibiting covert operations may be as difficult as outlawing impure thoughts.

There is no question that the government should make every effort to restrict covert CIA activities not only on campuses, but also among the press and in other areas of domestic life. At the same time, the academic community shares that responsibility. Universities can make it clear that faculty members who engage in covert activity for any outside agency — government or private — violate their academic commitments and the ethics of their profession. Similarly, the AAUP, which is the leading professional association of university teachers, can make it clear that it will support the censure and, in cases of flagrant abuse, the dismissal of any faculty member who uses his academic post as a cover for secret intelligence work or other covert activities.

The CIA has a legitimate mandate to gather and analyze foreign intelligence; the very breadth of that mandate requires restraint where it can be effectively imposed, restraint on the part of academics or others in positions of trust. If the academic community made its position clear on those matters, all parties would better understand the limits of potentially compromising relationships and the academic community would find it far easier to trust itself.

# American professionals abroad aid CIA

By Elaine Douglass

According to Director Stansfield Turner, the CIA depends heavily on Americans who travel abroad professionally as sources of information about foreign countries. This includes university professors and researchers.

Turner discussed the use of university and other professionals in a May 1978 letter to the President of Harvard University, Derek C. Bok. Harvard made the letter public in July.

In addition to expanding the CIA's eyes and ears, the use of professionals to gather intelligence abroad eliminates the problem for the CIA of developing credible disguises, or "cover," for regular CIA agents. Moreover, scientists can gain access, often penetrating access, in countries where other categories of visitors are restricted in travel, or barred altogether.

*The Tech* recently discussed these issues with Associate Professor of Earth Sciences Peter Molnar. Molnar, who is currently supervising field work in Afghanistan, indicated he would not cooperate in any CIA intelligence gathering. He agreed, however, that consideration of his field work could serve as a hypothetical example of how scientists might be useful to the CIA.

Molnar heads a project that collects seismological data in Afghanistan, and he and members of his research group have been stationed in areas of that country close to the Soviet Union.

A reputedly left-wing coup in Afghanistan in April has generated fears among some US government officials that Afghanistan might come under the sway of the USSR, and has heightened US interest in Afghanistan.

Members of Molnar's group have enjoyed relatively free access to Afghanistan, which they ar-

anged in part through French scientists.

In response to a question, Molnar commented that he could imagine his project as an example of one that could be used for CIA intelligence gathering, but he said it would be less than ideal for that purpose because the MIT scientific project is likely to be viewed with some suspicion by Afghan officials. "Since we are seismologists, the Afghan government may think we are recording Russian underground nuclear tests," Molnar said, "and for intelligence gathering it would be better for the CIA to rely on people who are a little less obvious than we are."

Molnar stated that members of his expedition might be in a position to gather intelligence. In response to various hypothetical intelligence missions posed by *The Tech*, Molnar agreed that the MIT scientists might be able to gauge the degree of support for the new government in the countryside. Scientists might, for example, be able to discover if the local people were armed, and whether they would be receptive to offers of arms from outside the country which they might use to oppose the new government or harass it in outlying provinces.

Molnar said that he has never been approached by the CIA in connection with the Afghan field work. He once was approached, however, in connection with a visit to MIT by Soviet scientists.

"After I received visits from S. A. Fedotov and P. I. Tokarev of the Institute of Vulcanology in Petropavlovsk in January 1977, a guy from the CIA called me."

"I met with him as a scientific experiment," Molnar said. "I wanted to see what a CIA agent would say. The agent wanted to know if the Russians had said anything about an electric generator in the Garm region of Tadjikistan."

"I was somewhat relieved," Molnar continued, "that I knew nothing about the generator, and I did not have to compromise myself either by concealing information, or by serving as a spy."

Molnar said he discussed his contact with the CIA with a senior colleague well informed on China. The colleague was dismayed, Molnar recalled, and asked Molnar, "Don't you know that if you are debriefed by the CIA you'll never get permission from the Chinese government to do work in China?"

STAT

# Anti-spying conference to be held at Union this weekend

By LEONARD BERNSTEIN

Attorneys, academics and concerned citizens from all over the country will converge in Ann Arbor this weekend for the first National Organizing Conference to Stop Government Spying this Friday, Saturday and Sunday at the Michigan Union.

Billed as a "nuts and bolts" organizing effort by Ann Arbor coordinator and graduate student Tom Shaker, the conference will be concerned primarily with devising strategies to try to counteract domestic government spying and harrassment.

"THE TIME for being shocked is over. Now it's what can you do about it," Shaker said. "This is taking it a step farther than everybody just being appalled."

Saturday night's plenary session will feature Morton Halperin, chairman of the Campaign to Stop Government Spying, (CSGS), which is co-sponsoring the conference, along with the University's Viewpoint Lectures organization.

Halperin, who resigned as a senior staff member of the National Security Council under Henry Kissinger in 1969, will speak on the presence of intelligence agencies on college and university campuses. Reports of recruiting and other activity by the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence groups has caused many schools — including the University — to consider drafting guidelines regulating

intelligence work on campus.

OTHER SPEAKERS slated for Saturday night's session include Michigan State Representative Perry Bullard (D-Ann Arbor), John Stockwell, former head of the CIA's Angola Task Force, Lennox Hinds, a defense lawyer in the Wilmington Ten case and Clyde Bellecourt, coordinator of the last summer's "Longest Walk" for Native American rights.

The "nuts and bolts" of the conference are the numerous daytime workshops and caucuses scheduled for Saturday and Sunday. These include informational programs on everything from coalition building and the use of the federal Freedom of Information Act to surveillance of gay activists and local fundraising.

In addition to providing information on more publicized topics like CIA recruiting and political prisoners, conference workshops will highlight lesser known examples of surveillance and harrassment by the private sector as well as government spying on environmentalists.

ACCORDING TO CSGS Field Organizer Sahu Aiken, the Philadelphia Electric Company and the Georgia Electric Company are "beginning to develop intelligence branches."

Aiken sees the use of these branches to spy on opponents of company policies as particularly dangerous.



THE MICHIGAN DAILY  
13 September 1978

# Be fair to the CIA and be fair to the students

**Y**ESTERDAY The Daily reported that Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner harbors some objections to a set of proposed guidelines which would restrict relationships between members of the University community and intelligence agencies.

The guidelines to which Turner questions were conceived by the University's Civil Liberties Board as a result of recent revelations about CIA covert activities here and at other college campuses.

Turner's concern focused on a clause in the guidelines - requiring "intelligence agencies such as the CIA" to obtain "the express prior consent of an individual" before "his or her name may be submitted by another member of the University community to an intelligence agency as a potential employee, consultant or agent."

Letters between University faculty and the CIA, made public through a Freedom of Information Act request, have shown that the CIA has used professors on this campus to "spot candidates" for possible Agency employment.

The CIA, once it has a student's name, initiates an investigation of the student which sometimes lasts for several years before the Agency decides to make a job offer. The only problem with this style of recruitment is that the student doesn't know she or he is being watched.

Turner was not entirely opposed to the requirement of openness but asked only that the University be fair. In a letter to University President Robben Fleming he stated: "I want you to know that this agency has no objection to the rule on personnel inquiries that is proposed, provided it is applied equally to all such inquiries. It does seem to me both inequitable and a

other applicants for personnel information or recommendations."

On this point we whole-heartedly agree with Director Turner. While the CIA has been under attack for its campus recruiting activities since the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities hearings in 1975, little if any attention has been paid to recruiting or other activities of corporations on college campuses.

Unfortunately, little is known about corporate connections to intelligence agencies. What we do know is this: ITT work with the CIA in Chile and helped set the stage for the military overthrow of the freely elected government of Allende. Honeywell Corp. and the FBI cooperated to disrupt protest over the corporation's contributions to the Vietnam War effort in the sixties. There are cases now before the courts which may ultimately show that a number of large American multinational corporations have kept political files on employees which were open to intelligence agencies.

The University is a place of learning, a forum for new ideas where students and faculty seek the truth. This cannot be done in an environment of suspicion and fear. Students and faculty members should not bear the burden of worry that whatever they say or do could be recorded and filed by a government agency whose clandestine activities have been morally repugnant to those who believe in truth and justice.

We urge University administrators and faculty members to first, note that the Director of Central Intelligence accepts guidelines which would protect the privacy of students and second, adopt guidelines, as Turner suggests, which would prevent anyone from making an unwarranted invasion into the lives of students, faculty members, or administrators.

Let's be fair to the CIA, but most of all, let's be fair to the students.

MICHIGAN DAILY  
UNIV. OF MICHIGAN  
7 September 1978

# Faculty to guide ties to CIA

By RENE BECKER

The faculty Senate Assembly was due to consider this month adopting guidelines to restrict relationships between University faculty, administrators, students and government intelligence agencies.

But due to strong objections from faculty members over the last set of proposed regulations, the Senate Assembly has postponed discussion of the issue until October or November, according to Shaw Livermore, Senate Assembly chairman.

The University Civil Liberties Board will write a new set of rules with the objections of faculty members in mind, said Livermore.

The call for such guidelines follows recent revelations of covert activities by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) here and at other college campuses.

A national group which has pushed for guidelines on the activities of intelligence agencies on college campuses, the Campaign to Stop Government Spying (CSGS), will hold its first national conference this month in Ann Arbor. The CSGS is a Washington, D.C. based special interest group comprised of more than 80 church and civil rights organizations.

AMONG THE first documents released last year by the CIA concerning the University showed that the agency conducted secret mind-control experiments on University Hospital patients in the early 1950's. In the document, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, a CIA pharmacologist, stated that the University was one of "five major points where chemicals (usually LSD and sodium pentathol) were being tested

and ARTICHOKE (the CIA code name for one of their first mind-control projects) work is being carried out."

As the result of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request The Daily received more than 200 documents from the CIA last spring which detail a variety of other agency activities on campus including covert recruiting.

When the CIA secretly recruits on college campuses, it uses a professor to "spot" a likely candidate. Then, without the student's knowledge or consent, the agency initiates a detailed investigation of the individual assembling information on the political views, financial situation and various activities of the potential employee.

THE STUDENT may be followed for years before the CIA decides to make a job offer. If the student is not asked to join the CIA or if the individual refuses the offer, there is evidence that the agency retains the student's file.

Foreign students are frequent subjects of CIA recruiting for its clandestine service — a practice the University's Civil Liberties Board has labeled as "particularly pernicious."

On December 20, 1974, Gary Foster, then CIA Coordinator for Academic Relations, mailed a letter to an unidentified contact at this University asking for "help in spotting candidates for an intensified minority hiring program we are currently conducting." Additional evidence of covert recruiting dates back to December 1, 1972 in a letter written on University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies stationery addressed to then CIA coordinator for Academic Relations Harold Ford.

IN THE LETTER a University

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ON PAGE 9

THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION  
5 September 1978

# *The CIA: New Defender of Academic Freedom?*

The agency and some professors assert limits on contacts deprive faculty members of rights

By Ellen K. Coughlin

Efforts by universities to regulate contacts between scholars and federal intelligence agencies have been stymied by an unlikely pair of allies.

Both the Central Intelligence Agency and a large number of professors have been arguing that such guidelines deprive faculty members of their academic freedom, as well as their constitutional right to associate with whom they please.

It is up to the individual scholar, not the universities, the critics say, to determine the propriety of such associations.

Two events triggered the effort to have such regulations adopted:

► In 1976, a special Senate committee investigating federal intelligence activities urged the academic community to "set the professional and ethical standards of its members" in regard to their relations with the C.I.A., the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other agencies.

► Harvard University adopted a set of guidelines on contacts with intelligence agencies. Opponents of the intelligence agencies' campus activities launched a campaign to get other institutions to adopt the Harvard guidelines.

More than a year later, however, only Ohio State and Syracuse Universities have joined Harvard, according to the Campaign to Stop Government Spying, a clearinghouse for information on U. S. intelligence activities.

The Syracuse statement is modeled closely on Harvard's, which covers contracts, consulting arrangements, recruiting, and intelligence gathering. The Ohio State guidelines deal only with C.I.A.-sponsored research.

The Campaign to Stop Government Spying lists another 21 campuses where guidelines are under consideration but says getting them adopted has proved to be an uphill fight.

## C.I.A. Director's Objections

In a series of exchanges over the past year with President Derek C. Bok and other Harvard officials—made public at a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence this summer—C.I.A. Director Stansfield Turner took sharp exception to portions of the Harvard guidelines.

According to Mr. Turner, the Harvard statement unreasonably pinpoints the intelligence community for special scrutiny.

In addition, the C.I.A. director argued, the Harvard guidelines violate individual faculty members' rights to privacy and free association.

The principal items of contention between Harvard and the C.I.A. involve the use of faculty members or administrators as secret recruiters or intelligence "operatives." The Harvard statement expressly prohibits both activities.

Testifying before the Senate committee, which is considering legislation to regulate the nation's intelligence agencies, Mr. Bok objected to the C.I.A.'s claim that it had been singled out unfairly.

"We have not extended such restrictions to other institutions that recruit on our campus only because we have no reason to believe that corporations or other private institutions are either using our professors for covert intelligence activities or recruiting our students for unusually hazardous assignments or for activities that may be illegal under the laws of another nation," Mr. Bok said.

In an earlier letter to Mr. Turner, Mr. Bok also argued that "citizens . . . are frequently subject to limitations on their right to engage in certain activities because of professional obligations they have voluntarily assumed or relationships they have voluntarily entered into," he wrote.

## 'Must Forgo Some Rights'

"In our guidelines we do ask our faculty and staff members, because of professional obligations and their voluntary relationship with other members of the academic community, to forgo rights that they would otherwise have as citizens," Mr. Bok continued. "We made this request because we concluded that the practices in question are inconsistent with the nature of a university community and the obligations of a member of the academic profession."

In a letter to Mr. Bok in May, Mr. Turner countered:

"Neither C.I.A. nor the academics with whom it deals view the services rendered by them as a breach of professional ethics or otherwise underhanded or disloyal to the individual's primary employer.

"Rather, we consider these individuals to be acting wholly out of good faith and praiseworthy motives in lending their assistance to our endeavors, and we doubt that they in any way compromise the integrity of the academic profession or infringe upon their official responsibilities to their institution.

"I simply cannot lend my affirmative support to or consider the agency bound by any set of procedures which . . . deprives academics of all freedom of choice in relation to involvement in intelligence activities."

Ironically, many professors, including some who wouldn't dream of working for Mr. Turner, agree with him on that point.

"Academics believe that one of their freedoms is to establish relationships with whatever outside organization they desire so long as their academic integrity is not compromised," said Henry Mason, a professor of political science at Tulane University.

*Morton H. Halperin*

# CIA's Campus Recruitment:

## Secrets From Whom?

When the Senate Intelligence Committee headed by Frank Church (D-Idaho) completed its 1978 review of current CIA activities on university campuses, it wanted to report the simple fact that the CIA had covert relations with university professors and administrators to assist the agency in the recruitment of foreign students studying at their universities.

The CIA refused to permit that information to be made public, claiming that to do so would jeopardize national security. The committee, anxious to complete its work, gave in to the agency. The committee's final report stated that some university officials assisted the CIA by, among other things, making "introductions for intelligence purposes." The committee put the sentence in italics, noting that it gave less than a complete description of what the committee was concerned about.

There the committee stood until Harvard University issued guidelines that prohibited university officials from engaging in secret recruitment and students at the University of California sought the files of the CIA's relation to the university under the Freedom of Information Act. In both cases the CIA sought to stonewall.

When Harvard sent a copy of its guidelines to the CIA, Director Stansfield Turner wrote back expressing opposition to another section of the guidelines dealing with consulting arrangements for research purposes. On the question of recruitment, he wrote only that the CIA conducts all of its staff recruitment openly.

It took Harvard a year of negotiation to get Turner to admit that there was

*The writer is director of the Center for National Security Studies and of the ACLU Project on National Security.*

an issue of secret recruitment. Turner would not confirm directly that the CIA was conducting secret recruitment on the Harvard campus or that it had ever done so. He did, however, state that the CIA would not give assurances that it was abiding by the Harvard

rules, which require recruiters to publicly identify themselves and to secure the permission of the individual before giving his name to the CIA. The CIA, he wrote, would continue to feel free to approach Harvard faculty members to ask them to become secret recruiters and to engage in covert operations abroad, another activity prohibited by the Harvard guidelines.

In the case of the University of California, the agency began by refusing to confirm or deny the existence of any documents relating to covert relations between members of the faculty and the CIA. The agency maintained that position through the Freedom of Information Act appeals process and in its response to a lawsuit filed by the ACLU Project on National Security on behalf of the students (*Gardels v. CIA*).

Project counsel Jack Novik demanded that the agency file an affidavit explaining why it cannot confirm or deny the existence of files revealing covert connections between the University of California and the CIA. In response, the CIA filed an affidavit in which it finally admitted that it has covert relations with faculty members, who assist the agency in foreign intelligence activity.

Turner, in a speech before the annual meeting of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), made it clear that the ongoing program related to the recruitment of foreign students with the covert assistance of university personnel.

Thus, the information the CIA refused to permit the Church committee to make public was not officially admitted by the agency. "Assist in making introductions for intelligence purposes" means the covert recruitment of foreign students studying on American campuses. Admittedly, the CIA was subject to some pressure from Harvard and the California lawsuit, but it made the information public without being ordered to do so by any court or, as far as one can tell, by direction of the White House.

There is no sign that the damage that the CIA warned of, and that it used to persuade a congressional committee to censor its report, has occurred. It should surprise no one that the CIA is

now refusing further disclosure. While telling Harvard that it will not obey its regulations, it has asked the *Gardels* court to sustain its position that it not be required to state whether it has ever had any covert contact with professors at the University of California (and it is taking the same position with schools where similar requests are in various stages of the administrative, process, and litigation).

The agency has now spelled out its reasoning: If it becomes known that there is secret recruitment at a campus, there will be pressure to find out who the professor is, and many academics will refuse to cooperate with the agency in covert recruitment if the fact of their involvement is made public. Thus, the agency admits that the secret is to be kept not from foreign intelligence services, but from Americans for fear they will end the spying on their campuses if they learn about it.

That is precisely the point. A university has the right to prohibit its faculty from spying on its students, whether Americans or foreigners, for the purpose of determining if they might in turn spy on their own governments for the CIA, and it has the right to prohibit the passing of information about a student without his or her permission. The Harvard guidelines do precisely that. The AAUP has adopted a similar position, and the University of California is moving in the same direction.

The CIA's position is that it will not confirm that such activity is going on for fear that it will be stopped, and that it will not abide by university regulations that prohibit it. It is now easier to understand why the Church committee said that ongoing CIA activities threaten academic freedom and that the CIA does not feel constrained by anything other than the fear of embarrassment when it operates on the university campus.

Summary of Correspondence

- (1) 13 Jun 77 - Ltr to President Bok, Harvard, from DCI concerning Harvard guidelines and summarizing Agency policy.
- (2) 12 Jul 77 - Ltr to DCI from President Bok citing differences in policies and inviting rep to meet with member of Harvard staff to reconcile differences.
- (3) 27 Jul 77 - Ltr to Bok from DCI asking for name of Harvard rep and Bok's preference for location of meeting -- Cambridge or Washington.
- (4) 11 Oct 77 - Ltr to Cord Meyer, Jr. From Daniel Steiner, Harvard General Counsel asking for confirmation of Steiner's understanding of CIA's position re Harvard guidelines.
- (5) 28 Oct 77 - Ltr to Daniel Steiner from Anthony Lapham, CIA/GC, stating it is against CIA policy to seek or obtain services of American staff and faculty members of U.S. academic institutions on an unwitting basis. Also stated that the final decision to disclose or not service to CIA should be at the discretion of the academic.
- (6) 5 Dec 77 - Ltr to DCI from President Bok reflecting on exchange of correspondence and visits and summarizing Bok's understanding of remaining differences between his position and that of the Agency.
- (7) 15 May 78 - Ltr to Bok from DCI concluding the exchange of correspondence, acknowledging existence of remaining differences and stating Agency position in positive terms.

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Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000100020001-4

Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000100020001-4

13 JUN 1977

Derek C. Bok, President  
Harvard University  
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear President Bok:

I have read with interest the new guidelines you have announced to regulate the relationships between Harvard, its faculty and staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. I particularly welcome your recognition of the need for an effective system for the production and collection of foreign intelligence within our government and your realization of the important contribution that the American academic community continues to make toward improving our understanding of foreign developments.

May I say that we in the Intelligence Community of the United States recognize and appreciate the immense benefits we receive from extensive relationships with scholars and academic institutions throughout the country. Leading historians and political scientists and some of their best pupils have brought a high degree of intellectual energy, curiosity, and integrity to our profession and have made sure that our analytical efforts continually take account of the best research available in the private sector. Indeed, we have systematically and conscientiously built many of the components and practices of the intelligence profession on models from academia. American scholars who have been willing to share information and interpretations of developments in the international arena often have contributed valuably to intelligence support of the U.S. foreign policy-making process. Without the continuing assistance of the academic community, our ability to provide the President and other senior officials with objective and enlightened analyses and estimates would be hampered. I believe strongly that in this increasingly complex and competitive world it remains in the best interests of both the academic and intelligence communities to expand and refine their contacts in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

-2-

Current CIA policy covering our relations with American staff and faculty members of U.S. academic institutions is already, to a large degree, consistent with the Harvard guidelines. Present Agency policies may be summarized as follows:

- All of our contracts with academic institutions are entered into with the knowledge of appropriate senior management officials of the institution concerned.

All recruiting for CIA staff employment on campus is overt.

It is against our policy to obtain the unwitting services of American staff and faculty members of U.S. academic institutions.


I am pleased that you have a guideline which expressly authorizes individual consulting arrangements with intelligence agencies. As I have said, these relationships are of inestimable value to us. I must, however, take exception with the provision in this guideline which requires your faculty members to report such arrangements in writing to the dean of their faculty. At least, I take such exception if a similar regulation is not applicable to liaison arrangements with industry, other governmental agencies, foreign governments, etc. If such is not the case, I believe that attempts to regulate the private lives of our citizens in a manner discriminatory to any particular group, profession or segment of society poses serious risks. I believe that we would be far safer not to single out any group, despite what may be transient enthusiasm for so doing. In point of fact, it is our policy in these cases to suggest to individual scholars that they inform appropriate officials at their universities of their relationship with CIA. Frequently, however, scholars object to advising any third parties on the understandable grounds that to do so would violate their constitutional rights to privacy and free association and possibly expose them to harassment and damage to their professional careers. As you are aware, there are two such cases of unfair and prejudicial harassment at this time on other campuses. Thus, the decision on whether to advise their institution of a relationship with CIA is left to the discretion of the individual. We intend to continue respecting the wishes of individuals in this regard.




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In closing, let me express the hope that your guidelines will help in improving the cooperation that already exists between the U.S. academic and intelligence communities. I also wish that you would bring promptly to my attention any case in the future where you think there has been an abuse or improper use of our authority. You can be assured that I will move quickly to ascertain the facts and to take such remedial action as may be necessary.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Stansfield Turner", written in a cursive style.

STANSFIELD TURNER



## HARVARD UNIVERSITY

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

MASSACHUSETTS HALL  
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

July 12, 1977

Dear Admiral Turner:

Thank you very much for your letter of June thirteenth concerning the guidelines promulgated by Harvard. I am pleased but not surprised that there are a number of similarities in your and our approaches to the question of relationships between the Central Intelligence Agency and universities such as Harvard.

There appear, however, to be some differences which may be significant. You refer to one--informing university officials of individual consulting relationships--in your letter. Although I think it is better for such relationships to be reported, the question seems to be one for individual institutions and the consultants to decide. The difference in our views may not, therefore, be of great significance.

I am more concerned about two other points. The first relates to recruiting on campus. In your letter you summarize present Agency policy as requiring that "All recruiting for CIA staff employment on campus is overt." The apparent limitation of this policy to "staff employment" could leave room for practices, outlined in our report, that I would regard as inconsistent with the nature of a university campus. The second relates to our guideline on faculty and staff involvement in intelligence operations. Your letter does not refer to Agency policy in this area.

It may be that amplification of your views and policies will reconcile any apparent differences in these two areas. It also may be that there are real differences that need to be explored through further discussions. If the latter is the case, I would be happy to designate a member of my staff to meet with your representative to discuss these matters more fully. The issues are important, and it might be in both our interests to try to resolve any differences that may exist. In any event, I would be happy to try.


Sincerely,

  
Derek C. BokAdmiral Stansfield Turner  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

The Director  
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505



27 JUL 1977

Derek C. Bok, President  
Harvard University  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear President Bok:

Thank you for your letter of 12 July. I am as pleased as you are to find that there is a wide area of agreement between us on the conduct of relations between Harvard University and the Central Intelligence Agency.

I note your concern that certain ambiguities remain and agree with you that further discussion might be useful in resolving these issues. Therefore, I suggest that your designated representative meet with members of my staff here in Washington. If that is inconvenient, I can ask my representatives to meet with yours in Cambridge. Please let me know which you prefer and with whom we should make the necessary arrangements.


Yours sincerely,

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL



MASSACHUSETTS HALL  
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138  
(617) 495-4778

October 11, 1977

Mr. Cord Meyer, Jr.  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Meyer:

Thank you for your letter of September twenty-seventh and the copy of the statement relating to newsmen and clergy.

I share your feeling that our discussion was helpful in defining the problem, and I will be discussing the issues with others here. I would like to be certain, however, that my understanding of the CIA's position concerning the Harvard guidelines is correct. Based on Admiral Turner's letter to President Bok and my discussions with you and your colleagues, I would conclude that the CIA feels it is appropriate to use, on a compensated or uncompensated basis, faculty members and administrators for operational purposes, including the gathering of intelligence as requested by the CIA, and as covert recruiters on campus (except in the case of recruiting for regular CIA employment, in which case the recruiter would identify himself). I would appreciate your letting me know if my conclusion is correct.

With thanks for your hospitality when we met.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Daniel Steiner".

Daniel Steiner

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

28 October 1977

Daniel Steiner, Esq.  
General Counsel  
Harvard University  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Dan:

This is in response to your letter of 11 October 1977 to this Agency relating to our ongoing discussions concerning CIA relationships with staff and faculty members of U.S. academic institutions. In your letter, you have asked whether or not you are correct in concluding that "CIA feels it is appropriate to use, on a compensated or uncompensated basis, faculty members and administrators for operational purposes, including the gathering of intelligence as requested by the CIA, and as covert recruiters on campus...."

Let me respond to your letter in the following manner. First, as the Director of Central Intelligence indicated to President Bok in his 13 June 1977 letter regarding the Harvard guidelines, it is against CIA policy to seek or obtain the services of American staff and faculty members of U.S. academic institutions on an unwitting basis. At the same time, we firmly believe that we have neither the right nor the duty to unilaterally deny any citizen, regardless of profession, the opportunity to furnish information or services which may be useful to his or her Government. Therefore, we cannot impose a flat prohibition on all relationships with staff and faculty members of U.S. academic institutions for a foreign intelligence collection purpose.

As I think is evident from our discussions and the time which we have devoted in general to this matter, this Agency is mindful of the serious and complex issues of a policy nature which are implicit in any and all relationships between CIA and the academic world. Because of our recognition of the delicate balance which must be maintained between the intellectual independence of academe on the one hand and the needs of the nation and rights of individual academics on the other, you may be assured that we will engage the confidential services of individual staff and faculty members in furtherance of U.S. intelligence objectives only on those occasions when it



has been determined by responsible officials that the individual in question is in a position to furnish especially valuable information or assistance to his or her country.

The Agency fully shares Harvard University's view that the issues involved in this matter are of fundamental importance. Reasonable people may honestly disagree on whether an individual staff or faculty member's assistance to CIA is advisable or proper, but it seems to us that the final decision should ultimately be left to the individual academic to make.

Sincerely,



Anthony A. Lapham  
General Counsel

STAT

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

1774-3408-11

Executive Registry
77-202/40

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

MASSACHUSETTS HALL  
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

December 5, 1977

Dear Admiral Turner:

Now that there have been discussions and correspondence between your representatives and mine concerning Harvard's guidelines on relationships between U.S. intelligence agencies and Harvard, it seems appropriate for me to write you directly to express my views and to invite your response.

The CIA's position, as I understand it, differs from ours on two significant issues: the operational use, including the gathering of intelligence on assignment, of faculty and staff members, and the use of faculty and staff members as covert recruiters on campus and practices associated with covert recruiting. The Harvard guidelines, in Sections C and D of the report that we issued, conclude that these two activities are inappropriate. The CIA has taken the position that these activities are a matter for decision on a case-by-case basis by the individual faculty or staff member and the CIA without the knowledge of the university and without regard to its rules. The rationale for the CIA's position appears to be that faculty and staff members can help the CIA perform its function in our society and that individuals at universities should be free to reach their own decisions on serving their country. (One aspect of the CIA's position is unclear. Mr. Lapham's letter of October 28th to Mr. Steiner states that the CIA should not "unilaterally deny any citizen...the opportunity to furnish information or services...." Does this mean that the CIA is precluded from directly or indirectly requesting or suggesting that a faculty or staff member serve the CIA and will consider the use of an individual for operational or covert recruiting purposes only if the initiative comes solely from the individual? We would appreciate clarification of this question by the CIA.)

I do not think that I need repeat the underlying rationale for Harvard's position on these two issues. The reasons are set forth in the two sections of our report. (A copy of Sections C and D is enclosed for your convenience.) But it might be helpful if I tried to address what I take to be the core of the CIA's position: that individual faculty and staff members, as citizens of the United States, should be free to serve the CIA and their country as they see fit.

I would not, of course, argue with the general proposition that citizens as a matter of individual choice can serve our country in a variety of ways, including the gathering of intelligence and other covert activities on behalf

of the CIA. Citizens, however, are frequently subject to limitations on their right to engage in certain activities because of professional obligations they have voluntarily assumed or relationships they have voluntarily entered into. Let me illustrate this point with two examples. Citizens ordinarily have the right to comment freely to the press concerning litigation in progress. However, a lawyer representing a party in a case before the courts is expected to restrict his comments to the press. Citizens ordinarily have the right to act as undercover agents for the FBI. It is doubtful, however, that a staff member of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. Senate could serve covertly the FBI by reporting information and conversations to which he was privy because of his job. In the first example our society's interests in the fair administration of justice are deemed to justify a restriction on free speech. In the second our system of separation of powers and the obligations assumed to one's employer justify restricting a person's ability to serve his country by helping the FBI.

In our guidelines we do ask our faculty and staff members, because of professional obligations and their voluntary relationship with other members of the academic community, to forego rights that they would otherwise have as citizens. We made this request because we concluded that the practices in question are inconsistent with the nature of a university community and the obligations of a member of the academic profession. Covert recruiting by university personnel and its attendant practices bring a new and disturbing element into the relationships among members of the academic community, represent a serious intrusion of the government into our campus and classrooms, and violate the privacy of individuals within the community. The use of a professor for operational purposes while he is abroad for academic purposes, such as attending a conference in his field, is simply a use of the academic profession as a cover and consequently compromises the integrity of the profession and casts doubts on the true purposes of the activities of all academics.

As pointed out in the introduction to the discussion section of our report, we proceed with caution when considering guidelines that would restrict the activities of our faculty and staff members. We also are aware, as stated in the conclusion of the report, that restrictions may make it more difficult for the CIA to perform certain tasks it has been asked to do. We remain convinced, however, that the primary thrust of the guidelines is appropriate and serves the interests of our society. Although there is perhaps room for reasonable differences of opinion on some details, and your response may be helpful in this regard, we believe that the guidelines provide a sensible answer to the serious problems brought to our attention by the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities.

I might be more comfortable with the case-by-case approach, with the striking of individual bargains between a faculty or staff member and the CIA if the process and the resulting bargain were open and subject to scrutiny.




December 5, 1977

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Then members of the academic community and others could weigh the competing interests in each case and reach a decision. But the very nature of the activities in question--their covertness--precludes such a result, and the CIA and the individual, whatever his motivations for agreeing to serve the CIA may be, are the sole judges. The covertness also means that universities such as Harvard will have no way of knowing to what extent the integrity of the American academic community is being compromised. Only the CIA will have the complete picture on an on-going basis.

The matters at issue are, of course, important not only to Harvard but to other academic institutions. It is fair to say that the present position of the CIA appears to mean a continuation, at the discretion of the CIA and individuals, of the covert relationships that caused the most concern to the Select Committee in the April, 1976 report. For this reason I would welcome your personal consideration of the issues described above.

Sincerely,

  
Derek C. Bok

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000100020001-4

### C. CIA Recruiting on Campus

We understand that, broadly speaking, the CIA uses two methods for systematic recruiting on university campuses. The first method involves sending an identifiable CIA recruiter to interview students and others who may be interested in becoming employees of the CIA. This method is open and visible and comparable to the recruiting efforts of other public and private organizations. We think it poses no issue of principle for the academic community.

The second method involves the use of individuals who may be professors, administrators or possible students and who have an ongoing confidential relationship with the CIA as recruiters. The job of these covert recruiters is to identify for the CIA members of the community, including foreign students, who may be likely candidates for an employment or other relationship with the CIA on a regular or sporadic basis. Although we are not certain how the recruiting process works, we understand that when the recruiter believes that a likely candidate has been identified, the name of the candidate is reported to the CIA, which then conducts a background check on the individual and creates a file with the information it obtains. Neither the recruiter nor the CIA informs the individual at this stage that he or she is being considered for employment or other purposes by the CIA. If the investigation confirms the view of the recruiter, the individual is then approached to discuss a present or future relationship with the CIA.

For a number of reasons we believe that members of the Harvard community should not serve as covert recruiters for the CIA. First and most importantly, it is inappropriate for members of the academic community to be acting secretly on behalf of the government in his relationship with other members of the academic community. The existence on the Harvard campus of unidentified individuals who may be probing the views of others and obtaining information for the possible use of the CIA is inconsistent with the idea of a free and independent university. Such practices inhibit free discourse and are a distortion of the relationship that should exist among members of an academic community, and in particular of the relationship that should exist between faculty members and students.

There are other reasons for members of the Harvard community not to be involved in such a covert recruiting system if our understanding of it is correct. Foreign students pose a special problem. It is not unreasonable to suppose that recruitment of a foreign national by the CIA may lead to requests that the person engage in acts that violate the laws of his own country. We do not consider it appropriate for a member of the Harvard community—especially a faculty member who may have a teaching relationship with the community—to be part of a process that may reasonably be supposed to lead to a request to an individual to violate the laws of another country. More generally, we question whether it is appropriate for a member of the Harvard community to trigger a secret background investigation of another member of the community. Such an investigation is an invasion of individual privacy, whether the subject of the investigation be a United States citizen or a foreign national. Moreover, the conduct of a secret investigation is likely to lead to additional secret governmental intrusion into the campus as the CIA tries to develop more information about the subject of the investigation. Finally, it is impossible to know to what uses the information may be put in future years and in what ways the life of the subject of the investigation may be adversely affected.

For these reasons we conclude that any member of the Harvard community who has an ongoing relationship with the CIA as a recruiter, with or without compensation, should make his or her role known to the Dean of the appropriate Faculty who in turn should inform the President of the University and the appropriate placement offices within the University. At the placement offices the names of recruiters would be available to all members of the Harvard community. Because of the CIA's authority to conduct secret background investigation, no recruiter at Harvard should suggest a name of a member of the Harvard community to the CIA as a potential employee or for other purposes without the consent of the individual.

We recognize that there are other possible CIA "recruiting" situations that do not involve an ongoing relationship between the CIA and the individual whose advice is being sought. For example, when a new President of the United States is elected, a faculty member might be asked to recommend candidates for top staff positions in the CIA. Or a faculty member who has had a consulting relationship with the CIA may be asked to recommend a colleague to undertake some specialized research for the CIA. Or a faculty member who has had a consulting relationship with the CIA may be asked to recommend a colleague to undertake some specialized research for the CIA. Occasional acts of recommendation such as these would ordinarily pose no special problems. Even here, however, an individual should exercise discretion to make certain that he or she is not causing difficulty or embarrassment for another member of the Harvard community. Depending on the circumstances, it may be appropriate to request consent from an individual before presenting his or her name to the CIA. Because of the special situation of foreign nationals, consent should be obtained before recommending a foreigner to the CIA.

*Recommendation: Any member of the Harvard community who has an ongoing relationship with the CIA as a recruiter should report that fact in writing to the Dean of the appropriate Faculty, who should inform the President of the University and the appropriate placement offices within the University. A recruiter should not give the CIA the name of another member of the Harvard community without the prior consent of that individual. Members of the Harvard community whose advice is sought on a one-time or occasional basis should consider carefully whether under the circumstances it is appropriate to give the CIA a name without the prior consent of the individual.*

#### D. Operational Use of Members of the Academic Community

According to the Select Committee, the CIA has used academics for a variety of operational purposes. (pp. 189-91) For security reasons the Select Committee's report does not state with any precision what these purposes have been, although it does indicate that they have included writing books and other materials for propaganda purposes, the collection of intelligence, and making introductions for intelligence purposes. It appears from the report that most of these relationships have been covert but at some universities at least one university official is aware of the operational use of the academics on the campus. The report does not state precisely what is involved in these "operational uses" or whether any of them take place on the campus. It is indicated that the "CIA considers these operational relationships with the United States academic community as perhaps its most sensitive domestic area and has strict controls governing these operations." (p. 190) These controls prohibit the use of academics who are working abroad under the Fulbright-Hays Act. (p. 190)

It is understandable that the operational use of academics should be considered a sensitive area because it poses several serious problems. Covert intelligence activities within the walls of a university are clearly an unacceptable intrusion into the academic community. When the CIA uses an academic when he is abroad to collect intelligence, or make intelligence introductions, the CIA is using with the consent of the academic the academic's ability to travel and meet with people in furtherance of his academic work. Put most simply, the academic enterprise provides a "cover" for intelligence work. This use of the academic enterprise should not, in our opinion, continue. It inevitably casts doubt on the integrity of the efforts of the many American academics who work abroad and, as a practical matter, may make it more difficult for American academics to obtain permission to pursue their interests in foreign countries. Speaking more broadly, we believe that the use of the academic profession and scholarly enterprises to provide a "cover" for intelligence activities is likely to corrupt the academic process and lead to a loss of public respect for the academic enterprises.

We would conclude, therefore, that members of the Harvard community should not undertake intelligence operations for the CIA. They should not, for example, when travelling abroad agree to perform any introductions for the CIA or attempt to obtain any information for the CIA.

This stricture does not mean that after returning to the United States academics should refuse to discuss their travels with the CIA, if they so desire. As stated by the Select Committee, occasional debriefings, which are analogous to the consulting arrangements discussed above do not pose a "danger to the integrity of American private institutions." (p. 189) Occasional debriefings do not involve an academic's taking actions or making observations as a result of instructions in advance from the CIA. However, debriefings of an individual on a regular or systematic basis can lead to implicit understandings between the CIA and the individual on the gathering of intelligence.

The involvement of academics in writing books and other materials for propaganda is a more difficult question to assess, because the Select Committee for security reasons provides no specific examples and because there is a wide range of possible propaganda activities. We hope that members of the Harvard community would not, as a matter of personal principle, become participants in activities that are known to involve partial truths or distortions. We would suggest a complete prohibition where the academic is publicly lending his name and position to material that he knows to be misleading or untrue, such as writing a signed introduction to a fabricated diary of a defector or writing for publication a review of such a diary. In such cases the academic is using the public respect for the academic profession to gain acceptance for material that is not true, an act which seems to us inconsistent with the scholarly and professional obligations of an academic.

*Recommendation: Members of the Harvard community should not undertake intelligence operations for the CIA. They should not participate in propaganda activities if the activities involve lending their names and positions to gain public acceptance for materials they know to be misleading or untrue. Before undertaking any other propaganda activities, an individual should consider whether the task is consistent with his scholarly and professional obligations.*

Washington, D.C. 20505

78-1376/1

15 MAY 1978

Derek C. Bok, President  
Harvard University  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear President Bok:

I want to thank you for your letter of last December 5, which correctly identified the two points as to which our representatives were unable to reach agreement in their discussions of the Harvard guidelines. I have not replied sooner, wanting first to reconsider my own position and to take full account of the views that you expressed. While my reappraisal has not caused me to shift my ground, or to accept as internal CIA controls the two Harvard guideline policies that were the focus of the discussions between our staffs, I would like to explain to you my recent thinking on this subject.

What we are dealing with here, in one of its many forms, is the question of what restraints should be observed by CIA in the performance of its intelligence functions. It is natural that we should approach that question from our separate institutional perspectives, but I am confident that we share the same fundamental concerns. Like you, I am resolved to see that academic freedoms are not threatened by intelligence activities, just as I assume that you are resolved with me to see that our national capacity to carry out these activities is not undercut or unduly reduced. Whatever our differences, we surely are agreed that in the end the country cannot afford either an ineffective intelligence service or a crippling of its academic life through governmental interference or intrusion, and that therefore ways must be found to bring the interests at stake here into a proper balance so that both can be served.

Information about foreign events and trends is the raw material from which finished national intelligence is derived. Much of the necessary information is not openly available and therefore cannot be obtained by open or publicized methods. Some of what is needed is gathered by technical means. The rest, being a critically important part of the whole, is gathered from human sources. Information-gathering from human sources is a particular responsibility of CIA, but the Agency is not self-sufficient in this regard. At almost every turn it requires the support and assistance of others. That is true, to take but one example among many that could be chosen, when it comes to arranging access

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or introductions to potential sources of information. If we are cut off from that base of support, or if it is too far narrowed, our effectiveness will be badly eroded or ended altogether. While in the present climate there is a certain clamor to add to the list of those with whom it is thought improper for CIA to maintain any confidential relationships, for the reasons stated I cannot accept such additional restraints in absence of a truly compelling justification.

The proposition you are asking me to adopt would rule out of bounds any confidential relationship with any academic for the purpose of conducting or aiding the intelligence activities specified in your letter. We are asked to forego all such relationships, and presumably to terminate any that exist, on the grounds that they are contrary to obligations that one assumes upon becoming a member, not just of the Harvard faculty or staff, but of the academic profession in general.

In support of your position, you argue that citizens "are frequently subject to limitations on their right to engage in certain activities because of professional obligations they have voluntarily entered into." As illustrations, you cite: a) the duty of confidentiality that a lawyer has to a client involved in litigation and the attendant restrictions this duty places on the lawyer's "right" as a citizen under the First Amendment to speak freely and publicly concerning his client's case; and b) the fact that a citizen's "right" to act as an FBI informant does not extend to a Senate intelligence committee staffer covertly providing the Bureau with information gained as a result of his position with the committee. While obviously I cannot quarrel with either your basic premise or with the illustrations themselves, I do think that our relationships with academics are wholly different in both principle and substance. Neither CIA nor the academics with whom it deals view the services rendered by them as a breach of professional ethics or otherwise underhanded or disloyal to the individual's primary employer. For instance, we do not ask a university official to provide us with a student's university biographical file or transcript without the latter's permission. Similarly, we do not seek (nor are we interested in) information from a professor on his institution's internal workings, activities, curriculum, etc. In short, countervailing considerations such as the fair administration of justice or a blatant conflict of interests, as exist in your examples, simply are not present in the nature and scope of the confidential relationships which academics have with this Agency. Rather, we consider these individuals to be acting wholly out of good faith and praiseworthy motives in lending their assistance to our endeavors, and we doubt that they in any way compromise the integrity of the academic profession or infringe upon their official responsibilities to their institution.

I want to emphasize that the views I am expressing do not merely reflect the "CIA's position," as your letter terms it; rather, our position is dictated not only by our perceptions of the national interest but also by the strongly-held beliefs of the academics with whom we deal. The initiatives leading to

these relationships may come either from the Agency or from the individual academics, but it is our policy to leave to the individual concerned, as a matter of choice or conscience, the decision whether to offer assistance in the performance of our functions. As has been pointed out in previous correspondence, these relationships are frequently kept confidential at the insistence of the individuals themselves, their concerns being that they might otherwise be exposed to harassment or other adverse consequences as a result of exercising their right to assist their Government.

It should not be inferred that CIA mindlessly ignores the status of the U. S. academic community as a discrete segment of our society, or that it follows no special procedures in its dealings with the institutions themselves and the employees thereof. On the contrary, we have recently adopted and rigorously adhere to an internal CIA Headquarters regulation which sets forth detailed, stringent restrictions on permissible relationships between CIA and academia. I am enclosing a copy of the actual text of this regulation for your information. Although I can fully recognize and understand the bases for Harvard's particular concerns, I nevertheless firmly believe that the standards set forth therein clearly evidence a reasonable and good faith effort by CIA to balance the principle of an independent academic world free from Government intrusion on the one hand with the needs of the nation and the rights of individual academics on the other. As it is, the restraints which we have already imposed on ourselves in this area have on occasion limited the capability of the intelligence community to perform the tasks it exists to perform. Nevertheless, CIA has chosen to formulate and operate under these limitations in the interests of and out of respect for the freedom and independence of the U. S. academic community. At the same time, it is our considered opinion that any further extension of the restrictions to effectively rule out the two types of activities in question is neither legally required nor is otherwise advisable in light of the potential obstacles which such action would pose to this Agency's ability to further avail itself of a willing, valuable resource to assist the Government in the performance of legitimate endeavors in furtherance of the nation's foreign policy objectives.

I fully recognize that the Harvard guidelines were established pursuant to a suggestion contained in the April 1976 report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Of course I do not question Harvard's basic right to promulgate internal procedures which place reasonable restraints on relationships between its employees and outside organizations in general. Nevertheless, I simply cannot lend my affirmative support to or consider this Agency bound by any set of procedures which, when read as a whole, singles out CIA, implies that any confidential association that an academic has with us is so inherently suspect as to require it to be publicly acknowledged and made "subject to scrutiny," as your letter puts it, and deprives academics of all freedom of choice in relation to involvement in intelligence activities.

On behalf of this Agency, I want to thank you, Mr. Steiner and the rest of your colleagues at Harvard for the considerate and responsible manner in which you have dealt with us on these difficult and complex issues.

Yours sincerely,

7/5/84 - 11:13 AM - STANSFIELD TURNER

STANSFIELD TURNER

Enclosure

CIA HEADQUARTERS REGULATION  
ON RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE  
U. S. ACADEMIC COMMUNITY

CIA may enter into classified and unclassified contracts and other arrangements with the United States academic institutions of higher learning as long as senior management officials of the institution concerned are made aware of CIA's sponsorship. CIA may enter into personal services contracts and other continuing relationships with individual full-time staff and faculty members of such institutions but in each case will suggest that the individual advise an appropriate senior official thereof of his CIA affiliation, unless security considerations preclude such a disclosure or the individual objects to making any third party aware of his relationship with CIA. No operational use will be made either in the United States or abroad of staff and faculty members of United States academic institutions on an unwitting basis. CIA employees will not represent themselves falsely as employees of United States academic institutions. CIA personnel wishing to teach or lecture at an academic institution as an outside activity must disclose their CIA affiliation to appropriate academic authorities; all such arrangements require approval in advance from the Director of Security. Pursuant to Federal law, CIA will neither solicit nor receive copies of identifiable school records relating to any student (regardless of citizenship) attending a United States academic institution without the express authorization of the student, or if the student is below the age of 18, his parents.



# Proposed UC rules would force profs to show CIA ties.

by JANICE FINCH  
STAFF WRITER

Following recent revelations of extensive covert contact between the CIA and UC Berkeley academics during the past ten years, the university has drawn up guidelines which it hopes will put an end to the controversy.

The guidelines, drawn up by UC's systemwide committee on academic freedom, will be presented to the UC academic senate and board of regents in the fall.

Berkeley history professor Richard Abrams, chair of the committee, revealed the proposals when testifying before a U.S. Senate select committee on National Intelligence held July 20 in Washington.

Abrams said the Academic Freedom Committee's report recommends that UC provide "public notice of any research, advising, or consulting arrangements between a government intelligence agency and the university, its employees and students."

The report also recommends that members of the university community be formally prohibited from engaging in covert operations or activities on behalf of any government intelligence agency.

Abrams said the need for these guidelines became apparent after 1976 U.S. Senate committee on national intelligence confirmed that for at least two decades thousands of academicians had engaged in covert activities for the CIA. These activities ranged from espionage to recruiting colleagues and students for covert intelligence work.

The report also found that some professors lent the authority of their credentials to publications used for "propagandistic purposes." The committee was reluctant to pass legislation restricting academicians' activities, however, because it claimed that it was the academic community's responsibility to set professional and ethical standards for its members.

Abrams said the UC Academic Freedom committee welcomes the opportunity to restate the university's professional ethical standards.

He said the UC report does not question whether a foreign intelligence service should exist or the right of academics to contribute to investigative agencies of other kinds. "It would be a waste of social resources to deprive such agencies of the energies and expertise available at universities," he said.

Abrams stressed, however, that the university is obliged to maintain high standards of intellectual honesty, which it should not compromise by covert association with government intelligence agencies.

"While it may be conceded that cover and deception are often necessary in intelligence gathering, for a member of the academic profession to so serve is for such a person to damage the very essence of what she is presumed to stand for," he said.

If the recommendations are approved, UC will join Harvard,

Syracuse and Ohio State as the only U.S. universities to pass regulations dealing specifically with CIA-campus contact.

Unlike the Harvard guidelines, approved in May 1977, which make provisions for covert CIA recruitment on campus, the UC guidelines are silent on the subject.

According to the 1977 Harvard report the CIA recruits in two ways. One is the overt practice of sending identifiable CIA recruiters to interview students. The other is covert, using faculty who have ongoing relationships with the CIA as recruiters. Their job is to identify people on campus, including foreign students, who may be interested in working for the CIA.

The Harvard report said that neither the recruiter nor the CIA inform the individual that he or she is being considered for CIA use.

The Harvard guidelines specifically prohibit this covert practice and require all on-campus recruiters to report themselves to the faculty dean and the university president.

Testifying before the U.S. Senate Intelligence committee, Harvard President Derek Bok said the CIA has taken issue with his school's guidelines.

"In correspondence with me, the CIA has advanced three arguments to justify its refusal to respect our guidelines," Bok said. "First, the CIA believes that it has been unfairly singled out as the object of special restrictions. In fact our report expressly covers all U.S. intelligence agencies."

"Second, the CIA asserts that our guidelines interfere unjustifiably with the freedom of individual professors to offer their services to the government." Bok said the guidelines were necessary to preserve the "integrity of our scholarly activities abroad and the atmosphere of candor and trust."

# Harvard, CIA Are at Odds

Associated Press

Harvard University and the CIA are sharply at odds over the agency's insistence that it be free to continue covert recruiting and operational practices on the campus, a Senate hearing has been told.

Derek C. Bok, Harvard's president, said yesterday the university has drawn up guidelines providing that it and members of its faculty and staff may maintain publicly known relationships with intelligence agencies that would not "threaten the integrity and independence of the academic community."

But he said it was clear from discussions with CIA Director Stansfield Turner that the agency "intends to ignore" provisions that all recruiting and other CIA activities on campus be open and above board.

**IN TESTIMONY** before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Bok said the CIA insisted on a right to secretly use faculty members, administrators and students to recruit others — especially foreign students — and to collect information useful in its own operations.

"I do not believe that an agency of the United States should act in this fashion," Bok said. "A Senate committee has called upon the academic community to set

standards to govern its relations with the intelligence agencies. Harvard has attempted to set such standards. Yet the CIA is declaring that it will simply ignore essential provisions of our guidelines."

The committee, established in the wake of the exposure of widespread abuses by the CIA and other agencies, is attempting to draft a charter to guide all U.S. intelligence policy.

Sen. Walter Huddleston, D-Ky., chairing the hearing, said it was clear that past intelligence activities had "adversely affected" the academic community. The proposed charter, he said, is aimed at assuring that all future relationships between the agencies and academia be "witting" ones.

Bok and two other witnesses, Morton Baratz, general secretary of the American Association of University Professors, and University of California history professor Richard Abrams, urged adoption of regulations barring any

covert activities by the CIA or other agencies on U.S. campuses.

**BOK FURNISHED** copies of letters between himself and Turner, in which the CIA director sought to justify covert campus activities on grounds that they are essential for national security.

Turner also complained that Harvard's rules "single out CIA" for special restrictions and interfere with the right of faculty and employees to "freedom of choice" in dealing with the intelligence community.

Bok said Harvard considers its rules "necessary to preserve the integrity of our scholarly activities abroad and the atmosphere of candor and trust that are essential to the free exchange of ideas."

Congress, he said, "should make clear that these activities cannot continue, and that the internal rules of academic institutions should be respected."

HACKENSACK RECORD (N. J.)  
27 June 1978

# Judge orders CIA to turn over data on FDU

By Larry Gordon  
Staff Writer

A federal judge in Newark yesterday ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to explain precisely why it has refused to say whether it has files on its possible activities at Fairleigh Dickinson University.

Mark Medoff, editor of the Teaneck campus student newspaper, The Gauntlet, has asked for the files under the Freedom of Information Act. Medoff claims that the CIA has been approaching teachers for information on Iranian students.

In an affidavit yesterday, the CIA said that denying or acknowledging the existence of any records could jeopardize its foreign intelligence sources and lead to harassment of the academic community at FDU and elsewhere.

"By denying their existence, a process of elimination could lead to the identification of sources at other universities," said the affidavit of John Blake, the CIA's director of information.

But United States District Court Judge Frederick Lacey refused to accept the CIA's response, calling it

*"Our contention is that the government's position would deny to your honor the responsibility of reviewing the record."*

— Howard Rosen, American Civil Liberties Union attorney

"artfully drawn to say a lot but tell nothing. It deals with vague abstractions."

"I want a precise position," Lacey told CIA attorneys from the United States Justice Department before post-

poning the case until July 10. The attorneys promised to submit additional briefs by July 5.

## National security

Howard Rosen, an attorney for the New Jersey Civil Liberties Union, which is representing Medoff, asked the judge to review any CIA files dealing with the school and to decide whether releasing them would endanger national security. Files considered vital to security are exempted from disclosure through the Freedom of Information Act.

Rosen told the judge, "Our contention is that the government's position would deny to your honor the responsibility of reviewing the record. The government is saying to you [that] it need not tell you anything but the bare conclusions."

Justice Department lawyer Daniel Metcalf said no nonvital files dealing with FDU had been found, but that a double-check would be undertaken. Metcalf said he was not implying that any security-risk documents existed.

Rosen, however, contended that at least some correspondence between the CIA and the university dealing with recruitment must exist. He said there is reason to believe that CIA research contracts may have been let to FDU professors.

"If a professor prepared a report on, let's say, the shoe industry in the Soviet Union," Rosen argued, "that could be embarrassing [to the professor], but it should not be classified."

## Domestic surveillance?

Rosen also contended that the CIA's refusal may have been prompted by fear of exposing that it had illegally engaged in domestic surveillance.

Metcalf said the CIA has openly recruited graduates from FDU and hundreds of other schools, but no records of such recruitment at FDU have been found.

Medoff first wrote to the CIA in February 1977 for files relating to FDU. The CIA told him that it found some material which originated with the National Security Agency. That agency refused

*"By denying [the record's] existence, a process of elimination could lead to the identification of sources at other universities."*

— John Blake,  
CIA official

to give Medoff information. The CIA refused even to acknowledge if it had any records on FDU.

In the affidavit reviewed by Judge Lacey yesterday, CIA officer Blake said: "Our contracts with academic institutions are, of course, made known to senior university officials."

FDU President Jerome Pollack has said he was not aware of any CIA activity at the school.

## Sources called invaluable

Blake called academic sources invaluable for the national interest and said identification of them could be dangerous. "Such sources place in jeopardy, in many instances, their reputations, credit, livelihoods and, in some cases, their personal safety," he said.

"The CIA can respond only by refusing to confirm or deny existence of any information which would even imply the existence of such relationships."

Metcalf said four similar cases asking for disclosure of CIA involvement at universities are in other courts.

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ON PAGE 746

THE NATION  
24 June 1978

## LETTERS

to make the horror real

### the CIA and the scholars

Lawrenceville, N.J.

While public attention has focused on sensational misdeeds of the CIA, very little has been said about another aspect of CIA activities which can be extremely harmful to this country. I refer to CIA influences in our leading academic institutions. Senator Church's committee, after stating that it was "disturbed" by its findings (which included occasional participation by academics in propaganda) wrote that "it is the responsibility of private institutions and particularly the American Academic Community to set the professional and ethical standards of its members. . . ." (*Academe*, June 1976.)

Recently some Ivy League colleges have been reported to permit faculty members to work for the CIA when the deans of their departments approve the topic. In view of close contacts between some university administrations and the CIA, with the latter's intermixture of basically incompatible functions of intelligence and propaganda, there can be no assurance that this measure alone will be effective.

Prof. Norman Birnbaum's recent recommendation [editorial, *The Nation*, April 1] should be expanded to prohibit any intelligence agency from participating in or administering propaganda and covert activities. Then the academic community could find it easier to prohibit as unethical any contacts between its members and institutions engaged in propaganda. . . .

Gregory P. Tschebotaroff

NASHVILLE BANNER

22 June 1978

# Reports On CIA Recruiting Do Not Concern Colleges

By PEGGY REISSER  
Banner Staff Writer

There appears to be little concern at local colleges over reports that the CIA has been conducting secret recruitment of foreign students on U.S. campuses.

The recruitment activities, involving 150 colleges, were confirmed last week by CIA Director Stansfield Turner at the national convention of the American Association of University Professors.

Turner would not disclose which campuses were involved or what the foreign students were being recruited to do.

He did say that "very few" of the 120,000 foreign students in the United States are under contract to the agency.

Only a few local foreign students said they have been approached in the past by someone they believed was a recruiter from the CIA.

For instance, one Vanderbilt graduate student from Algeria, who asked not to be identified, said that two years ago he was offered \$100 to write a paper about his country.

The offer came from a man who said he represented a multinational corporation. The student said he believes the man was with the CIA.

Administrators at Nashville colleges said they have no knowledge of any secret or open recruitment of foreign students on their campuses.

"I have not had it brought to my attention in relation to our students," Joan Elliot, foreign student advisor at Tennessee State University, said.

James Worley, director of the economic development program at Vanderbilt, said he "would be surprised if the CIA were on the campus."

The recruiting of foreign students is usually accomplished by direct contact between the recruiters and the students, Lynn Snuffer, with the Washington-based Campaign to Stop Government Spying, said. It is also conducted through faculty members who are asked the names of potential recruits, she said.

In the past, the CIA has recruited American students at colleges through the placement offices.

Students were recruited to work at the agency's headquarters, but none has been recruited here in the past few years, college officials say.

The recruitment of American students would be welcome in the future if handled through the proper channels, most of the college placement office directors said.

DES MOINES REGISTER  
19 June 1978

## CIA on campus

"Most large American colleges enrolled substantial numbers of foreign students, and many of these, especially those from the Third World, were (and are) destined to hold high positions in their home countries in a relatively few years. They were much easier to recruit at American schools — when they might have a need for money, where they could be easily compromised, and where foreign security services could not interfere — than they would be when they returned home.

"To spot and evaluate these students, the Clandestine Services maintained a contractual relationship with key professors on numerous campuses. When a professor had picked out a likely candidate, he notified his contact at the CIA and, on occasion, participated in the actual recruitment attempt."

Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks wrote that in 1974 in their book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." This method of recruitment of foreigners continues today, as CIA Director Stansfield Turner told a meeting of the American Association of University Professors on June 10. Turner said only a "few out the 120,000" foreigners studying or teaching in this country are recruited, and that the CIA's recruiting process is no more secret than that of private businesses.

Despite Turner's assurances, we are bothered to learn that this recruitment practice continues and that U.S. academics still maintain secret ties with the CIA.

We can accept a teacher doing research for the CIA — provided that teacher's connection is not

secret and the research does not further possibly illegal activity. But we think it wrong if the CIA and the academic community trade on the vulnerability of student, foreign or American, or use thoughts or written statements expressed in confidence to a teacher for recruitment purposes.

Regarding CIA use of academics, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence wrote in its 1976 report: "If the CIA is to serve the intelligence needs of the nation, it must have unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce. But this advice and expertise can and should be openly sought — and openly given."

In affidavits filed in a case brought by a California man seeking records of CIA involvement with the University of California, the CIA said ties with academics are very often kept secret at the academic's request. Academics apparently are concerned they will be badgered and persecuted should their CIA connections become known.

But such secrecy might raise questions about the integrity of the college or university, as it has with the University of California. Last year, Harvard University established guidelines that allow Harvard and its staff to do consulting work for intelligence agencies, but only if contracts are made public; staff members who violate the guidelines can be dismissed.

That's a policy other academic institutions should follow. The old CIA-school tie shouldn't be allowed to hang undisturbed in the closet.

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Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000100020001-4THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION  
19 June 1978


# Turner Says the CIA Recruits Foreign Students in U.S., Defends Agency's Use of Professors

By ELLEN K. COUGHLIN

NEW HAVEN, CONN.

Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, says his agency is recruiting "a few" of the more than 200,000 foreign students in this country, but that the contacts are "without coercion, entirely free, and entirely a matter of choice" for the students.

Addressing the annual meeting here of the American Association of University Professors, Mr. Turner said the recruitment of foreign students and professors on U. S. campuses was no more secret than the recruiting done by business organizations or



CHRONICLE PHOTOGRAPH BY PHILIP W. SEMAS

Morton Halperin, a critic of the Central Intelligence Agency, questions Stansfield Turner, its director, at professors' meeting.

CONTINUED

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## 3 RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM All Things Considered... STATION WETA Radio  
NPR Network

DATE June 14, 1978 5:00 PM CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT CIA Recruitment on American Campuses

BOB EDWARDS: Last Saturday, the American Association of University Professors held a meeting in New Haven, Connecticut to discuss the issue of recruitment on American campuses by the Central Intelligence Agency. And CIA Director Stansfield Turner revealed during that meeting that the CIA was openly recruiting foreign students who are attending U.S. schools to be used as information sources when they returned home. Turner supplied that information in answer to a question from Morton Halperin, who was also a panel member representing the Center for National Security Studies.

This afternoon, NPR's Noah Adams talked with Halperin about Turner's statement.

NOAH ADAMS: Can we call this an admission?

MORTON HALPERIN: Yes.

ADAMS: It's the first time he's said it.

HALPERIN: I was surprised not by the fact. I was surprised by the fact that he was willing to admit it publicly.

ADAMS: And said it's open as recruitment as, say, IBM would come on to a campus.

HALPERIN: Well, no. He's saying that both -- everybody recruits secretly as well as openly. And what Admiral Turner said was that the CIA has a clandestine network, or a secret network of relationships with university professors and others at universities which it uses to help identify and to recruit foreign students.

ADAMS: And what's your basic concern about this? What's



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ON PAGE A-21

THE WASHINGTON POST  
12 June 1978

# Academics Still Secretly Inform CIA

By Timothy S. Robinson  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The CIA continues to maintain an "invaluable" network of academic informants on college and university faculties upon which it "depends daily...for information, guidance and insight," CIA officials have acknowledged in court records here.

The disclosure of the continued CIA use of unidentified academicians follows by two years a suggestion by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee that all such contacts be open instead of covert.

In affidavits filed in a Freedom of Information Act suit here, CIA officials said it is generally up to the professor to decide whether to disclose his voluntary CIA cooperation to his employer.

Several sources familiar with intelligence gathering said, however, that it would be highly unlikely for most CIA informants to disclose to superiors their cooperation with the agency.

Occasionally, CIA officials said, relationships are kept secret by the academicians "at our request."

More often, the CIA officials added, "they are discreet at the scholar's request because of his concern that he will be badgered by those who feel he should not cooperate."

In the court case, brought by a California man seeking records concerning the agency's relationship with the University of California, the CIA says the scholars are considered "sources of intelligence" and therefore secret under federal laws.

As justification for withholding the names of University of California personnel who might be involved with the agency, the CIA filed two affidavits that give a public accounting of the current use of academicians.

John F. Blake, deputy director for administration, said in his affidavit that all the relationships with academicians are for "foreign intelligence purposes."

Most of the contacts are with professors who "have traveled abroad" or who are experts in various fields of study, he said. However, one element of the agency maintains confidential contacts with college personnel "for assistance in the recruitment of foreign intelligence sources," he added.

He called cooperation with academicians "vital to the intelligence collection mission of the CIA."

Regular contacts with them "enable us to keep abreast of professional developments, including new insights, interpretations, and methodologies," Blake continued.

Public disclosure of the contacts might result in "active and abrasive campaigns to discover and expose the individuals concerned on at least some" campuses, he said.

Blake said, cooperating academicians in many cases "place their reputations, credibility, livelihood and in some cases even their lives on the line in providing information."

The CIA's personnel director, F.W.M. Janney, said in an affidavit that the campus contacts are necessary to properly protect national security. He said, in many fields it is "absolutely essential that the agency have available to it the single greatest source of expertise: the American academic community."

CIA analysts at its National Foreign Assessment Center consult regularly with "the academicians on an 'informal and personal basis, often by telephone," with the understanding that the contacts will be confidential, Janney said.

Janney said, without specifying, that scholars whose CIA contacts have become public were subjected to harassment and ridicule by students and other faculty members.

"There is also evidence that such scholars, despite recognized standing in their fields of expertise, have been subjected to professional disabilities, including denial of tenure and dismissal from their positions as a result of acknowledging such informal contacts with the CIA," Janney said.

The Senate Select Intelligence Committee said in an April 1978 report that many of the CIA's contacts with academicians are not dangerous but that the "operational use" of academicians raised serious questions about preserving the integrity of academic institutions.

According to the committee, several hundred American academicians, "in addition to providing leads, and, on occasion, making introductions for intelligence purposes, occasionally write books and other material to be used for propaganda purposes abroad. Beyond these, an additional few score are used in an unwitting manner for minor activities."

In suggesting that all contacts with academicians be open, the senators said:

"... If the CIA is to serve the intelligence needs of the nation, it must have unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce. But this advice and expertise can and should be openly sought—and openly given."

STAT

THE NEW HAVEN REGISTER  
11 June 1978

# CIA Recruits Foreign Students On U.S. Campuses, Turner Admits

By DIANE ZAVRAS  
Staff Reporter

The Central Intelligence Agency does hire foreign students on U.S. campuses but "without coercion," CIA Director Stansfield Turner disclosed Saturday.

"The CIA needs to contract with some foreign students in our country," he told more than 500 faculty delegates at the national convention of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) here.

Turner, who said he was making his first public remarks on the issue of recruiting foreigners in the nation's colleges, contended methods used were "no more secretive in my opinion than much of the other recruiting that is done" in academe.

But, he said, "Let me assure you all such contracts are without coercion; entirely free and entirely a matter of choice."

On the general issue of recruiting, Turner, who was largely responding to questions from CIA critic Morton Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies, said, "We recruit today openly on about 150 different campuses just like businesses or other government agencies."

He added, "I'm sorry to have to tell you there are a few campuses on which we are denied the right to have free communications and free association."

Turner contended that it "should be very obvious" the intelligence agency is "just as dependent as the American business community and the American academic community on recruiting good U.S. students."

He told delegates attending the 64th annual AAUP convention that Halperin thought it was wrong when individuals are not informed they are being considered for CIA positions.

Yet, Turner said, "Everyone of you every year, I suspect, gets a number of letters asking who is a good graduate student, or who would be a good professor to be head of a department at another university."

"We recruit just like everybody else does. Some of it is open; some of it is not."

Amherst College President John William Ward felt freelance faculty ties should be known to college administrations.

Turner agreed that if colleges like Ward's require "all outside commitments of academic members be reported to the administration, the CIA should be no exception."

He would disagree, he said, if the CIA relationship "should be singled out as it is in the Harvard guidelines which assume only a relationship with the CIA would endanger the professor's or the school's integrity."

"And with all the opportunities today for conflict of interest, we think that is a naive assumption."

On operations, Turner pointed to the incompatibility of "having good intelligence and having 100 percent openness" and noted it was not the intelligence unit alone that had secrets.

"In the academic community, Ph.D. researchers certainly don't share their research before they publish it," he said.

"All of us have the problem of where we draw the line between complete public inspection of our activities and some degree of secrecy," he said. "We have been drawing it further and further in this country."

The AAUP Saturday approved a resolution submitted by the California delegation asking Gov. Edmund G. Brown Jr. to guarantee due process to faculty members whose jobs are threatened by budget cuts following last week's stunning Proposition 13 vote.

California faculty spokesmen had indicated earlier the governor may target the four-year public campuses of the University of California and California State University in \$300 million cuts sought because he considers higher education a "discretionary" rather than mandatory item.

Some 3,300 positions at California State alone may be in jeopardy, according to June Pollak, AAUP coordinator there.

A national AAUP stance was prompted partly by worry among delegations at the convention that what happens in California as a result of the historic referendum, which drastically pared property tax revenues, could reverberate through many other states and public university campuses.

The faculty group from the State University of New York notably endorsed the measure with the reminder that it had already gone through retrenchment which resulted in layoffs two years ago.

STAT

American Association of University Professors - 10 June 1978

Third Speaker - Morton Halperin

STAT

I appreciate this second opportunity to speak to you although I must say that hearing these two rather clear and somewhat classical statements of the two positions, I feel a little bit like the donkey in the famous story of the man who was visiting in Eastern Europe and had to get to a small village over the mountains. Not knowing how to go he hired a guide who arrived early in the morning in a wagon pulled by a donkey. They set off to a village over the mountains and they got to the first mountain and the donkey refused to go up. So the guide got out and he pulled the donkey up the mountain. They got to the second mountain and the same thing happened. At the third mountain as they got out the man said to his guide, I'm here because I have to get to the next village, you are here because you're guiding me, but tell me why did you bring the donkey? I want to say that I agree very much with what Admiral Turner said about the importance in research of an independent intelligence agency which provides that research to the Executive Branch, to the Congress and to the public. And I agree also on the importance of cooperation between the academic community and the CIA in the conduct of that research. But that seems to me to make it even more imperative that we "anti" the improper activities of the CIA because I think those improper activities interfere with the kind of relationship which

American Association of University Professors - 10 June 1978

Second Speaker - Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence

Good morning, good afternoon. In thinking about being with you here today, I was struck by the commonality of our profession. The intelligence profession, the academic profession are both founded on good research and searching out information. They're both founded on analyzing that information, interpreting it, adding to the fund of knowledge available. They're both founded on publishing that data, making it available to those who need it so they can draw better conclusions in whatever line of work they are engaged. In our country there is a similarity because in the non-governmental sector there's a greater concentration of research skills as identified by a PhD in the academic community than anywhere else; in the governmental sector that concentration is in the intelligence community. We have more PhD's than anyone else in the government. This commonality means in my view that we have a good enough foundation for a more comfortable, a more mutually supportive relationship than has existed in recent years. I happen to believe that a more mutually supportive relationship between us is particularly important to the United States of America today. Why? Because good intelligence is more important today than at any time since World War II. Your contribution to it can be significant and entirely proper.

Why is it more important that we have good intelligence? Thirty years ago we had absolute military superiority. Today we are in the position of mere parity. Clearly, the leverage of knowing other people's capability and intentions in the military sphere is much greater when you are at a position of parity. Thirty years ago we were totally

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John William Ward  
 President  
 Amherst College

"The C.I.A. and the Academic Community"

One may take two perspectives on the Central Intelligence Agency: the first from the perspective of a citizen, the second from the perspective of a member of the academic community. The two perspectives converge, however, on a single important question: how to maintain conditions which support a free and open society?

We live in a culture used to verbal excess. The argument why the C.I.A. raises questions about the conditions of freedom in modern American society rests, however, on two assertions which may sound excessive, but which I mean seriously, however quietly I prefer to give voice to them.

First, the C.I.A. is a threat to the traditional meaning of the Constitution of the United States;

Second, the C.I.A. is a threat to the integrity of the academic community, and the integrity of the academic community is important to the social conditions of freedom in a democratic society.

1. The Founding Fathers had a deep skepticism about human nature and its weakness against the temptations of power. A proper constitution should, they thought, provide security against arbitrary power. To compress a long and complicated historical argument, one may say there have been from the beginning in American political thought two views how power may be made responsible.

The first view places emphasis on the form of government created by a constitution, on the institutional arrangement of the departments of government. Responsible government is to be achieved by setting up a government in which power is distributed carefully among the various parts in order to check undue power by any one particular branch in the whole, finely articulated, self-regulating system. In this view, checks against the abuse of power

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17 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Coordinator for Academic  
Relations and External Analytical  
Support

FROM: Herbert E. Hetu  
Director of Public Affairs

SUBJECT: Answer to Media Inquiries Concerning  
DCI Meeting with University Presidents  
and Academic Dignataries

Following is a general statement which we will issue in answer to news media inquiries concerning future meetings with university presidents and academic dignataries:

"From time to time the Director of Central Intelligence invites university presidents and other academic dignataries to meet with him in Washington to discuss how the intelligence community can better maintain effective relationships with academic institutions throughout the United States. The meetings are designed to provide a free flowing exchange of ideas on how to establish better academic-intelligence relationships, taking into full account the problems of the past and attitudes of the present. Details of the discussions remain private."



Herbert E. Hetu

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

5 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence *rb*  
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM

[Redacted]

STAT

SUBJECT : Meeting with University Presidents and Academic Dignitaries

1. Action Requested: Signature on the reply to Wes Posvar's letter and the letters to ten academic dignitaries inviting them to the Agency for a day of discussion and briefings sometime in June.

2. Background: The letters to the eight university chief executives and the presidents of the American Council on Education and the Association of American Universities are only marginally different from the ones you sent to eight university presidents inviting them to the first meeting of this kind on March 10. Wes Posvar recommended this group, and spoke to them in April in Palo Alto about your desire to improve communications between the academic and intelligence communities. Wes writes that they all have a constructive attitude in this regard. He also told me in a recent conversation that he believes they constitute about one quarter of the most prestigious and influential leaders in academia.

3. In addition to Wes and the ten men he has recommended, I will also reinvoke three presidents who were not able to accept your March 10 invitation but who said they were anxious to accept at another time. They are Robert Sproull, President of the University of Rochester, Norman Hackerman, President of Rice, and Peter Magrath, President of the University of Minnesota. Sproull, incidentally, is one of the men Wes met with in Palo Alto. The reiterations of your invitations to these three gentlemen will be handled informally [Redacted] new letters from you do not seem to be necessary.

STAT

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Meeting with University Presidents and Academic Dignitaries

4. Although we are inviting fourteen men (bios attached), we can probably expect only about half to be able to accept. University presidents generally work year round (unlike many faculty who are on nine month contracts), but we will have difficulty settling on a date in June that will be convenient for you and them. [redacted] and I agree with Wes Posvar's recommendation (his letter is attached) regarding the scheduling. Several days after your letters are posted, this office will contact the offices of the fourteen invitees and settle on a date in June agreeable to most of them, based in the first instance on your schedule.

STAT

5. The schedule and sequence of meetings for the June visit should be substantially the same as the successful meeting of March 10. Once a date is settled on, this office will coordinate the remaining arrangements. I have discussed all of this with

[redacted] who as you know, is to undergo surgery.


STAT

6. Actions Recommended:

- a. That you sign the letter to Wes Posvar.
- b. That you sign the letters to the ten distinguished academics.
- c. That you indicate your concurrence to the proposals above for handling the second university presidents visit.

STAT

Attachments



ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY



5

11 May 78

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Meeting with University Presidents and Academic Dignitaries

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STAT

NFAC/CAR,  (5 May 1978)

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

The Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

78-4340/21A

11 May 78

Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Wes:

I am delighted that you were so successful in Palo Alto in your discussions about relations between the intelligence and academic communities. Very shortly I will be contacting the eleven gentlemen you met with to invite them to visit CIA for a day of substantive discussions and briefings. As you know, the first meeting of this kind was held on March 10 and was quite rewarding for all concerned.

I have decided to try to arrange the next meeting for sometime during the month of June. [ ] and [ ] of my Academic Relations Staff will settle on a date that is agreeable to you and to as many of the men you spoke with as possible. [ ] and [ ] also will coordinate arrangements.

I do look forward to seeing you again at that time, and hope that we can arrange to have some time together privately and informally. Once we have settled on a date, we can make additional plans.

Yours,

  
STANSFIELD TURNER

Dr. Wesley W. Posvar  
Chancellor of the University  
University of Pittsburgh  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260

STAT

STAT

11 May 78

Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear President Sanford:

Since its inception, the Central Intelligence Agency has sought to maintain effective relationships with scholars and academic institutions throughout the United States. These relationships have been of inestimable value to the intelligence community and ultimately, to the foreign policymakers it serves.

In the wake of considerable public criticism over the last several years, however, the Agency has had difficulty in maintaining these open and mutually beneficial relationships. I would like to ask your help and advice in determining how best to restore a useful but proper connection between academia and the world of intelligence.

Clearly there are limits beyond which we in the intelligence profession should not go in dealing with members of the academic community. I do have very express rules with respect to that today, but how we are operating within these rules is not always clear to others. Today there are also many new opportunities to use unclassified information derived through the collection of intelligence for the benefit of academic research. I do not believe that we have the proper mechanism today to ensure the adequate provision of such information to academic institutions.

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Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'ST' or 'STAN', written in a cursive style.

STANSFIELD TURNER

President Terry Sanford  
Duke University  
Durham, North Carolina 27706

11 May 78

Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear President Saxon:

Since its inception, the Central Intelligence Agency has sought to maintain effective relationships with scholars and academic institutions throughout the United States. These relationships have been of inestimable value to the intelligence community and ultimately, to the foreign policymakers it serves.

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STANSFIELD TURNER

Dr. David S. Saxon, President  
University of California  
Berkeley, California 94720

The Director

Central Intelligence Agency

Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000100020001-4

11 May 78

Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear President Sawhill:

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STANSFIELD TURNER

Dr. John Sawhill, President  
New York University  
Washington Square  
New York, New York 10003

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 May 78

Dear Dr. Peltason:

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STANSFIELD TURNER

Dr. Jack W. Peltason, President  
American Council on Education  
One Dupont Circle  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 May 78

Dear President Parks:

Since its inception, the Central Intelligence Agency has sought to maintain effective relationships with scholars and academic institutions throughout the United States. These relationships have been of inestimable value to the intelligence community and ultimately, to the foreign policymakers it serves.

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STANSFIELD TURNER

Dr. William R. Parks, President  
Iowa State University  
Ames, Iowa 50010

11 May 78

Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear President Muller:

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STANSFIELD TURNER

Dr. Steven Muller, President  
Johns Hopkins University  
34th and Charles Streets  
Baltimore, Maryland 21218

Central Intelligence Agency

11 May 78

Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Chancellor LeMaistre:

Since its inception, the Central Intelligence Agency has sought to maintain effective relationships with scholars and academic institutions throughout the United States. These relationships have been of inestimable value to the intelligence community and ultimately, to the foreign policymakers it serves.

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STANSFIELD TURNER

Dr. Charles A. LeMaistre, Chancellor  
University of Texas  
Austin, Texas 78701

Washington, D. C. 20505

11 May 78

Dear President Fleming:

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STANSFIELD TURNER

Dr. Robben W. Fleming, President  
University of Michigan  
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109

The Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 May 78

Dear Dr. Bartlett:

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STANSFIELD TURNER

Dr. Thomas A. Bartlett, President  
Association of American Universities  
One Dupont Circle, Suite 730  
Washington, D.C. 20036

11 May 78

Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear President Hackney:

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STANSFIELD TURNER

Dr. Francis S. Hackney, President  
Tulane University  
6823 St. Charles Avenue  
New Orleans, Louisiana 70118

16 May 1978

## Faculty Differs On Proposal

# U-M Weighs CIA Regulation Policy

*Law professor James White called the statement unduly vague and said each person would have his own definition of phrases like serious harm.*

**By Robert Cummins**

HIGHER EDUCATION REPORTER

University of Michigan professors expressed conflicting opinions Monday on a proposed policy on relationships between U-M faculty, staff and students and intelligence agencies.

The proposed policy was developed by the U-M Civil Liberties Board and was discussed at the regular monthly meeting of Senate Assembly, the faculty's representative body.

The statement says "recent disclosure of covert recruitment activity and intelligence gathering by the CIA within the University of Michigan and other American universities" has made a policy necessary.

**IT PROPOSES** a "dual test of secrecy and potential for serious harm or deceptive consequences" for prohibited relationships.

The policy says express prior consent of an individual is required before his or her name may be submitted by another member of the University community to an intelligence agency such as the CIA as a potential employee, consultant or agent.

It also says special attention should be paid to avoiding compromising foreign national students.

On enforcement, the policy statement says it is the responsibility of the members of the University community who acquire knowledge of possible violation to bring them to light promptly. "Adjudication and penalties for violations will be the responsibility of University bodies and officials and be governed by existing rules and regulations as appropriate."

**JAMES WHITE**, law professor, called the statement "unduly vague" and said each person would have his own definition of phrases like "serious harm."

Bruce Freidman, pathology professor who is chairman of the Civil Liberties Board, agreed that the statement is "somewhat vague," but said it was workable.

Stephen Tonsor, history professor, said all secret relationships should be outlawed. "The university spirit demands openness," he said. "Students have a right to know what secret relationships exist. It is disgusting to entertain relationships which cannot stand the light of day. I want to see every secret relationship a matter of public record."

Lawrence Jones, physics professor, disagreed with Tonsor, saying that if someone suggested a way he could help free a Soviet dissenter who was on trial, he would want to be able to help, even if it required a secret relationship.

**ERIC RABKIN**, English professor, said he agreed with Tonsor's condemnation but had different reasons. He said the statement interfered with political freedom and freedom of speech.

"You are willing to use the University as a tool to proscribe actions which civil authorities could not themselves proscribe," Rabkin said.

Friedman indicated some revisions would be made in the document in

line with the discussion before it is submitted for adoption at the June meeting.

Earlier in the afternoon, the Senate Advisory Committee on University Affairs (SACUA), the executive board for Senate Assembly, drew up an agenda for its May 22 meeting with President Robben W. Fleming.

**THREE OF THE** items deal with the University calendar. First is the varying length of the fall semesters. Second is scheduling examinations during Passovers. Third is the trimester system itself.

Lawrence Jones said the present trimester is too short. "I'm frankly embarrassed by the amount of material I am able to transmit in a three-hour course. It is just not as much as it should be," he said.

The present term lasts 13 weeks. The schools of law, medicine and dentistry have retained 15-week terms, it was noted.

Shaw Livermore, chairman of SACUA, said he would like to see a comparison of the rationale for the trimester system with actual experience.

The fourth item, sparked by references to the fact that Fleming is approaching retirement age, will be the faculty's role in the search for a replacement.



SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER  
10 May 1978

# UC committee meets secretly to talk about secret activities

By Annie Nakao  
Education Writer

The Academic Freedom Committee of the University of California faculty has met in a closed session to discuss guidelines that could prohibit covert intelligence operations on UC campuses.

The committee is an arm of the statewide UC Academic Senate. It met for several hours last Friday but officials barred reporters because of the meeting's "advisory" nature.

Dr. Irwin Feinberg, committee chairman, refused to discuss its recommendations to the statewide Academic Senate Council. He said the discussions were only "preliminary" and the committee wasn't a policy-making body. He said the press' presence would tend to "inhibit" free discussions.

"We feel confident that we are proceeding in the proper way," said Feinberg. He said he couldn't understand "why this was a big deal. Our deliberations will be made public at the time our recommendations are considered by the academic council June 14."

One source said the recommendations were similar to those approved last year by Harvard Uni-

versity. It was the first large university to adopt guidelines governing campus intelligence activity.

The academic freedom committee has members from each of UC's nine campuses, but at least three were reported to be unrepresented at the meeting. Only one student representative, who asked to testify, was present.

Joe Leitmann, vice president of the Associated Students at Berkeley, said it was "ironic" and "ridiculous" that the committee would discuss the secrecy of intelligence activity in a closed meeting. The regents are exempted from the state agency rule that requires open meetings, except for personnel matters. Whether this also applies to faculty bodies has never been tested.

"The whole thing was done rather casually, and I'm disturbed," said Leitmann. "I think it's important to have more than one student testify. We had no experts, no one from Harvard, or any faculty, pro or con."

The issue of adopting such guidelines arose during the March Board of Regents meeting. Student regent Michael Salerno introduced guidelines for consideration. He said he was prompted by newspa-

per reports of one UC official having had long-time relations with the CIA on the Berkeley campus.

Salerno's proposal drew sharp criticism from UC President David Saxon at the time and was tabled.

Harvard's guidelines were written, in part, by former Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox last year. They contain six provisions, including requirements that individuals report to the dean all direct or indirect consulting for the CIA; that CIA recruiters identify themselves and notify persons they intend to investigate as possible recruits, and that "members of the Harvard community" (not defined) not undertake intelligence activities which lend their names to material that they know to be misleading or untrue.

Another guideline prohibits Harvard faculty from helping the CIA to obtain the "unwitting services" of another faculty member. But they contain no sanctions for violators.

Lynn Snuffer, of the Washington-based campaign to Stop Government Spying says two other campuses — Syracuse and Ohio State universities — have adopted similar guidelines. A number of others are studying proposals.

# CIA On Campuses

## Documents Report Agents Into 70s

By MARGARET COFFROTH  
Bee Staff Writer

The CIA used paid informants and "resident agents" to monitor political activities on U.S. college campuses — including several in California — from 1967 to 1973, according to agency documents.

The CIA documents are the first indication that the agency's domestic surveillance program — "Project Resistance" — moved onto the country's turbulent campuses, where agents monitored not only demonstrations against CIA recruitment and the Vietnam War, but also protests involving internal university issues, such as special programs for black students and tuition increases.

The documents were made public by the Washington D.C.-based Campaign to Stop Government Spying and the Center for National Security Studies, which requested the files through the Freedom of Information Act.

By clipping student newspapers and relying on informants and "resident agents," California field offices compiled weekly reports on various campuses, including San Francisco State College, San Fernando Valley State College, Stanford University, and the University of California campuses at Berkeley, Santa Barbara and Los Angeles.

Although the CIA is no longer permitted to perform "counter-intelligence activities within the United States, back in those days the guidelines were a little vague" about domestic surveillance, CIA spokesman Dale Peterson said in an interview. At the time of the clandestine activities on U.S. campuses, the CIA had the authority to work on all matters related to "national security," according to the National Security Act of 1947.

In an undated document profiling Project Resistance, the agency offered an explanation for its information-gathering effort:

"This project was originated in an effort to identify any threat against Agency personnel, installations or projects and to determine if there were any foreign sponsorship, encouragement or training involved.

"The Deputy Director for Support was concerned because student demonstrations began to show a sense of

organization, central direction, commonality of demonstrations and techniques, and common or repeated phraseology in literature and materials. In essence: Organization."

Various documents expressed the concern of high-level CIA officials for the safety of their campus recruiters, ostensibly the primary reason for the monitoring.

One document dated Jan. 17, 1975, indicated that in February 1967 the CIA's Office of Security was first directed to assist the Office of Personnel Recruiting Division "in any way possible. This was based primarily on a recruiter being held a prisoner at Columbia University for several hours."

Field offices and "resident agents" were supposed to monitor the campuses using contacts such as campus, state and local police, the FBI, Air Force, Army and Navy personnel, informants and newspaper clippings in order to warn recruiters if their visits might spark violent demonstrations.

But the same document also noted: "As Security could only make recommendations against not going to a college there were a few times when Security and recruiters disagreed on the possibility of trouble, one must understand that the more aggressive recruiter wanted to do his job — didn't want to back down from the creeps, and so forth and it was his decision to go or call it off."

Although not connected to campus recruiting, the CIA took a keen interest in black student unrest and the movement to establish Afro-American studies.

In a three-page "Special Information Report" dated Oct. 9, 1970, the agency detailed the "political climate" at San Fernando Valley State College, which made the news in 1968 when about 200 knife-carrying students held college officials prisoner to protest treatment of black athletes.

The document noted: "The campus is quiet compared to last year because the student government reportedly has the administrative and academic operations of the school seriously intimidated. . . Los Angeles intelligence officials flatly state that Valley State College is the most radical college in Southern California in terms of (radical organizations') membership numbers and the ability of the old and new left to control student activities. . . The Black Student Union at Valley State is regarded by intelligence sources in Los Angeles as the strongest in the United States."

The agency also detailed "several borderline (sic) racial subjects" taught at the campus, including "Social Change and Problems of Cultural Change." But the report also noted, "With all its problems, Valley State still educates many moderates and conservatives. . . In summary, San Fernando Valley State College is politically troubled and racially tense. The odds are that the school will get through the year without bombings and without violence, but no one will be surprised if it does not make it."

In another such special report on black student activities, the agency had harsh words for the way militant protests were being handled by Cornell University's then-president James A. Perkins and concluded he should resign:

"The peace and tranquility formula of Cornell's President James A. PERKINS (CIA capitalization), one of soft permissiveness, has imbued the campus black militants with sufficient courage to utilize brute belligerence. . . That the Ithaca campus could be so deformed by strife is in part attributable, ironically, to the president's well-meaning liberalism in recruiting black students, many of whom were ill-equipped for Cornell's academic standards."

(One month after the internal report was circulated, Perkins announced his resignation.)

Some of the protests monitored seemed to have little relationship to legitimate CIA concerns. An agency-published "Calendar of Tentatively Scheduled Activities" for May 1969, called attention to a planned protest against tuition increases by Purdue

See 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000100020001-4  
 special reports on individual campuses and the present and future possibilities for student unrest.

One campus was Stanford University, which "despite its serene setting and its largely white middle- and upper-class student body. . . has not been without its turmoil and problems, particularly in recent months. . ." noted an April 29, 1969 file. The report attributes what little unrest there was to the leadership of the campus chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society and its protests against the university's war-related research.

UC Berkeley, credited by the CIA as being where "the die of modern college protest history was cast. . .", was mentioned frequently in agency documents.

One such report in May 1969 describes the People's Park demonstration when 482 persons were arrested and the National Guardsmen were called in to maintain order:

"Last week the dissident students and non-students in Berkeley. . . found just exactly the 'd--d if they do and d-u--d if they don't' type of dilemma to present the overworked and constantly harassed authorities at (UCB). By appropriating to their own use a valuable piece of the University's real estate. . . the authorities were faced with two basic alternatives: one, to ignore the dissidents and thereby seem to acquiesce in their illegal activity; or two, to force evacuation of the cleverly named 'People's Park' and move ahead with their own plans for the property."

The CIA also kept track of right-wing student groups. A report in 1969 indicated, "A 'new right' student organization has in recent weeks emerged on the university scene. The National Youth Alliance. . . has counteracted the takeover tactics of the SDS at several campuses in the past week or two. Although the initial impulse is to cheer them on as they route (sic) the SDS from a Columbia University building, a closer examination of the organization. . . gives food for considerable, sober thought."

The report goes on to describe the group as "closely resembling the Hitler Youth of the 1930's."

In January 1971 all special field agents and resident agents were notified in a memorandum that the scope of Project Resistance was being limited immediately and no new requests for information should be requested from informants. However, the memo also noted if information is "gratuitously" offered by informants, agents should feel free to accept and file it.

THE SEATTLE TIMES  
1 May 1978

# Head of U.W. Law School New dean wants C.I.A. kept off campuses

by JULIE EMERY

Universities should be communities for open discussion, free of clandestine or similar government watching, according to the new dean of the University of Washington Law School.

Ernest Gellhorn said that if a report that the Central Intelligence Agency has clandestine operations on more than 100 campuses — "or for that matter on any campus" — is correct, such operations should be stopped.

Such activities seem beyond the agency's authority and are "inappropriate in our society," said Gellhorn. An atmosphere of freedom is essential to the dialog and research that are crucial to a university, he added.

Gellhorn, 43, was a senior counsel for the Rockefeller Commission named by former President Gerald Ford to investigate charges that the C.I.A. illegally spied on American citizens.

Many of the commission's findings, issued in June, 1975, were incorporated into an executive order by President Ford that imposed constraints on the agency's domestic surveillance. The order also explained the obligations and responsibilities of government in intelligence collection.

**GELLHORN, FORMER** law dean at Arizona State University, Tempe, suggested four steps to protect and preserve universities' independence:

— The C.I.A. should "rigorously adhere" to recommendations of the more than 12-year-old Katzenbach Report regarding secret contracts with student groups and on campuses.

— Recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission report should be implemented fully. "Until this occurs, we cannot be

assured that the C.I.A. has confined itself to lawful activities," Gellhorn said.

— The National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978, proposed in February by the Senate Select Committee, should serve as a basis for new legislation giving the C.I.A. and other security agencies specific charters. It is time to "set forth the do's and don'ts in this area," he said.

— Universities should protect themselves by adopting rules and procedures similar to guidelines set up last year at Harvard University.

Gellhorn said the "modest steps," also will recognize the legitimate needs of security and not impair proper investigations and intelligence gathering.

"Spying on American campuses has not been fruitful in the past and seems an unlikely place for gathering sensitive information relating to national security in the future," the dean said.

"But we should recognize that the rules are not self-enforcing. There is no substitute for the appointment of sensible and sensitive leaders for the C.I.A. and other security agencies."

**GELLHORN'S REMARKS** were made in response to a talk at Stanford University by Morton Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies, who said the "C.I.A. feels free to operate, and clearly seeks to operate, on every campus with a large foreign student population, a faculty which travels and a high-quality student body."

Halperin said foreign students face a special problem since they may be sought either as recruits for "friendly" intelligence agencies in their own country or as

homeland.

The U.W. has about 1,800 foreign students.

Mike Shanahan, U.W. police chief, said campus police have not had dealings with the C.I.A. on the campus other than the times the agency recruits college graduates at Loew Hall's Placement Center.

Any security investigations involving the university have been through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Shanahan said, and those were "years ago," during the protest era of the early 1970s.

**ASKED ABOUT** police surveillance, Gellhorn said:

"We are developing a much more civilized society where we give much greater credence to individual privacy and seek to strike a more careful balance between societal needs and individual rights."

"... And the police are caught in the middle," he said. But that doesn't mean police are in for tough times, he said, but rather it is a question of "knowing the game."

Of the Allan Bakke medical-admissions case now before the United States Supreme Court, Gellhorn said it is a case "where you could get nine opinions."

If the high court upholds Bakke, the next challenge may be to financial aid because it discriminates against wealthier citizens, the dean said, adding that the Bakke case has "enormous ramifications."

# Faculty councils oppose UW-CIA regulations

by karin davies

**A**dditional regulations are not necessary to prevent unethical ties between the University and the U.S. intelligence community, specifically the CIA, according to recommendations made yesterday by two faculty councils to the Faculty Senate Executive Committee.

The recommendations came in response to a request by UW President John Hogness that the Faculty Senate review a report by Steve Olswang, assistant to the provost.

Olswang said "the report was endorsed by all faculty committees who reviewed it and the Executive Faculty Senate concurred with their conclusions."

Olswang's report says existing University policies adequately monitor relations with government intelligence agencies. He concludes that because no direct links to secret CIA involvement here have been reported by the media or faculty, there is no reason to develop preventative guidelines.

Freedom of Information requests filed with the CIA by the Daily and the ASUW Board of Control could yield information substantiating that link.

The information should be received by May.

He said "this is the end of the issue and no new policies will be instituted because everyone agrees" that regulations governing intelligence involvement on campus are not necessary.

Everyone does not agree, however. In a letter to Morton Kroll, Faculty Senate chairperson, Jane Kenig, member of the Faculty Council on Grants and Con-

tract Research, said, "In general, we support the memorandum; however, there is one exception with regard to intelligence gathering. We recommend that University of Washington policy be stated very clearly in the matter. It should be the policy of the University of Washington that faculty, staff, and students should not undertake secret intelligence operations for the CIA or other intelligence agencies if they are identified as members of the University of Washington academic community."

Elaborating, Koenig said, "In light of the public attitude toward secret intelligence gathering, we wanted to get it down in black and white as a University policy that we are against such operations."

Joe Racek, who initiated the FOI petition, agreed saying, "I still maintain that regardless of whether or not there's any CIA activity on campus there is a need for a University policy."

He stressed the importance of the UW making a point that the administration will not tolerate clandestine CIA involvement even though the guidelines may not be followed.

Olswang's report said involvement in intelligence activities should be left to the individual's own moral and ethical standards as it "falls squarely in the realm of personal and professional integrity."

While recognizing the difficulties in enforcing guidelines on intelligence funding and involvement, John Prothro, associate professor of biological structure, said institution of an ethical conduct code would "create certain ex-

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## *ASUC calls on profs to justify CIA work*

By EVAN LEE  
Staff Writer

The ASUC is demanding that university officials who work with the Central Intelligence Agency publicly justify their relationships with the organization.

The ASUC Senate Wednesday night voted for the demand, which specifically is aimed at Professors Chalmers Johnson and Robert Scalapino, both in the political science department.

Johnson, who chairs the political science department, has said that he exchanged information with the CIA. Recently released CIA documents state that Scalapino also has exchanged information with the agency.

Both Johnson and Scalapino declined comment on the ASUC resolution.

The bill's author, Academic Affairs Vice-President Mark Courtney, said that Johnson and Scalapino should have to publicly defend their associations with the CIA because, he said, those relationships threaten other political science professors' academic freedom.

Courtney said that because the CIA is an organization with a definite political perspective, Johnson's relationship with the agency biases his recommendation of which teachers in the department should receive tenure. Courtney cited Professor John Starr, whom Courtney said the CIA would not want to gain tenure.

The university denied Starr tenure last summer.

The senate showed little opposition to the bill. The only senator who voiced reservations was Anne Bakar. She objected to the resolution's tone.

"It would be more effective if it didn't put administrators and teachers on the defensive. We're being too dogmatic, and it hurts," she said.

The senate spent most of its meeting confirming nominees for governmental positions. After a heated debate, it voted 9-7 to confirm Charles Gilcrest as Elections Council chair. But because the voting rolls won't close until today at 5:00, the confirmation is not final.

Many senators opposed Gilcrest's confirmation because he managed the campaign of the Progressive Coalition party during last fall's election. Several senators were elected last fall on the Progressive Coalition platform, and most of them will run for re-election in the spring.

President Trudy Martin said she would consider using her veto if the vote ends up in favor of confirmation, but the senate could override a veto with a simple majority vote.

The senate also confirmed the nomination of Mark Braiman to the Judicial Committee but failed to produce the 19 "yes" votes needed to confirm Shelley Smith, JoAnne Speers, and Paul Clark. They could still be confirmed if enough senators vote "yes" by 5:00 today.

# U.C. rules hurried

The Academic Senate of the University of California at Berkeley will take action at its next meeting to "draw up rules and regulations" regarding links

between the university and the Central Intelligence Agency, according to John Raleigh, Senate chairman.

The importance of such regulation came to light yesterday when it was reported by the Los Angeles Times that there have been long-standing ties between the CIA and the university.

Raleigh, an English professor, said the immediate concern should be to regulate future liaisons of the types reported.

According to the Times, the documented CIA activities included:

- A two-week tour of duty with the CIA by former state-wide U.C. Vice President Earl Bolton.

- CIA sponsorship of information-sharing seminars at Berkeley and other locations for professors believed to be friendly to the agency.

- Providing favored professors with a steady flow of information on China and the Soviet Union.

The history of contacts was revealed in documents released by the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act. The documents, numbering about 800 pages, date from the late 1950s through 1977.

The disclosure of the agency's presence at the university has confirmed longtime charges of a special relationship between the CIA and some university officials.

U.C. President David Saxon released a statement on the disclosure in which he commented on Bolton's tour of duty with the CIA during a naval reserve training requirement in 1968.

"He did not and was not expected to make reports to the university administration about his assignments with the Navy," Saxon said in the statement.

It was further reported that Bolton used university stationery to correspond with then-CIA deputy director Vice Admiral Rufus B. Taylor.

"Mr. Bolton's use of official stationery to correspond about naval reserve assignments was contrary to university policy which restricts the use of university stationery to correspond about the official business of the university," Saxon stated.



## Records Reveal CIA Campus Activities; Scope of W&M Recruitment Unknown

by Catherine Baker  
Flat Hat Staff Writer

Illegal Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spying on college campuses during the politically tumultuous late sixties and early seventies has been revealed by 67 documents recently declassified following a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suit.

William and Mary is one of 250 colleges listed in CIA documents as having been visited by CIA recruiters. Some of these 250 colleges also had "contractual relationships" with the agency beyond the overt "contacts" the CIA had with Placement Officers for recruitment purposes, according to a 1975 Memorandum to the CIA Chief of Review Staff from the Director of Personnel.

The CIA "established certain relationships which might be categorized as 'special' or 'particular,'" the memorandum stated. Such relationships were made known "to an appropriate senior official" of each college,

but not "to the individual students," it is noted.

What these "contractual relationships" involved and whether William and Mary was involved in one are not revealed by the declassified documents.

John Bright, Director of Veterans Affairs and the Placement Officer at the College in the late 1960's, denied any knowledge of a "contractual relationship" with the CIA and did not recollect any CIA recruiters ever being on campus. However, Stanley E. Brown, Director for Corporate Relations and Placement and former Assistant Director of Placement and Financial Aid, remembered two specific CIA recruiters here.

"They have not recruited on campus for three or four years," he said, and said that with the economic recession, the CIA, like most businesses, received so many applications that it no longer had the need to recruit. The Flat Hat is currently requesting under the FOIA any

documents pertaining to CIA overt or covert operations on this campus.

The FOIA suit, filed by Morton Halperin of the Center for National Security and Civil Liberties, and John Marks of the Center for National Security Studies, requested copies of reports, letters, lists, and other information submitted to the United States Senate committee investigation in 1975.

The documents were released late last November, though some were censored or completely denied.

The Campaign to Stop Government Spying is a coalition of 80 groups which calls for the end of covert operations abroad, political spying and harassment in the United States, and secret budgets and charters of the intelligence agencies.

A Campaign newsletter cites a 1968 letter by CIA Director Richard Helms as evidence of illegal spying on college campuses.

The newsletter mentioned a cover letter to the report, "Student Dissent and its Techniques in the United States," in which Helms said, "It is an effort to identify the locus of student dissent and how widespread it is." Helms also advised in a cover letter to the report, "The Restless Youth," that the FBI "be authorized to use more advanced investigative techniques in dealing with this problem." The newsletter further reports that Helms admitted such investigations were in violation of the CIA charter.

The revelation of illicit CIA activities on college campuses, according to the newsletter, contradicts the findings of the Rockefeller Commission, which conducted an investigation of the CIA during the Ford administration.

The newsletter reported that the CIA has claimed that it was involved with dissident student activities to protect the recruiters from harassment and to investigate foreign ties.

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# CIA Is No Four-Letter Word

## Why Shouldn't It Seek Scholars' Help in Doing Its Legitimate Job?

BY ERNEST CONINE

The Carter Administration has issued guidelines intended to prevent future abuses of power by the Central Intelligence Agency. Congress is drawing up a new charter giving the force of law to constraints on CIA conduct. In short, a conscientious effort is under way to square the need for accurate and timely intelligence with the need, in a democracy, to curb the darker impulses that arise within a supersecret spy agency.

Let's hope that when all the t's are crossed and all the i's are dotted, this country will outgrow the absurd but surprisingly widespread notion that intelligence activities are dirty and un-American by definition, and that the CIA has no right to ask decent and honorable Americans to help the agency do its job.

These thoughts are occasioned by a spate of articles in recent weeks "exposing" a long history of contacts between the CIA and scholars at, among other places, the University of California.

Most such articles implicitly or explicitly suggest that scholars or university officials who cooperated with the CIA were shamefully manipulated by the agency, and/or were themselves guilty of violating the sacred principles of academic freedom.

Of course the CIA has been guilty of abuses in this area, as in others. Some scholars and administrators doubled as CIA advisers and consultants without informing their superiors. Some university scientists worked on human-behavior research projects without being told that the ultimate customer was the CIA.

Such activities will be severely curtailed under the new guidelines, and properly so.

What's troubling is the inclination in academic and press circles to take perfectly legitimate activities and lump them into the dirty-tricks department.

What is wrong, for example, with scholarly experts on Russia or China or Middle Eastern oil attending seminars sponsored by the intelligence agency, or getting themselves on the CIA's mailing list for information in their areas of interest?

What is wrong with the CIA picking the best brains in academia for information or analyses of events in far-off places?

To argue that scholars automatically contaminate themselves through such contacts is plain silly. Just how silly can be seen by posing the question in another context.

In Moscow there is an organization called the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, a think tank that, among other things, advises the Kremlin on the proper reading of American political and policy trends.

Director Georgi Arbatov and other officials of the institute also serve as high-level public-relations personnel, meeting with influential American scholars and journalists to ex-

*Ernest Conine is a Times editorial writer.*

plain Soviet positions—and, occasionally, to drop tidbits of information that have not appeared in the tightly controlled Russian press.

A ranking official of the institute, in fact, is in Los Angeles this week.

It is no great secret that Arbatov's institute is a subsidiary of the KGB, the Soviet intelligence organization. No one is suggesting that American scholars should avoid any contact with the Soviet institute on that account; everybody recognizes that such meetings constitute legitimate, potentially valuable exchanges. But, that being true, it requires a peculiar brand of double-think to argue that the same sort of contacts with our own CIA are intrinsically evil.

The question we must ask ourselves is whether it is important for the President and his policymakers to have the most accurate information possible when they make decisions that directly affect the peace and prosperity of the American people. To put it another way, does it matter if they go off half-cocked on the basis of bad information?

Surely the answer is obvious.

When the U.S. Army fought in Korea 25 years ago, a lot of Americans died because most of our generals had not got around to acquainting themselves with the military literature of the Chinese Communists.

One reason the United States made so many mistakes in Vietnam was that this country had

so few genuine experts on Indochina—and didn't pay enough attention to those it did have.

Of more current concern, it is of vital importance that the United States know the details of the Soviet military buildup—and, to the extent possible, its motivation—in order to decide what concessions can safely be offered in arms-control talks. To the degree that we don't know, we must err on the side of caution—which hardly contributes to the prospects for successful agreements.

There are other questions:

Will the next generation of Soviet leaders be any more amenable to genuine, live-and-let-live detente than the present group? Would the sale of more American equipment and technology contribute, in the long run, to the evolution of a more open, less oppressive Soviet system? Or would it merely help Kremlin leaders avoid the painful necessity of cutting military spending in order to cope with the problems of slow economic growth?

What are the chances that China and Russia will kiss and make up? If they do, what will be the effect on the behavior of each toward the West?

Will Saudi Arabia remain willing to produce enough oil to meet this country's growing needs?

Does the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from South Korea carry with it the risk that Japan, nervous about its own security, will go nuclear?

To what extent can the democratic pretensions of the big Italian, French and Spanish Communist parties be taken at face value? Would such parties, once in power, try to lead their countries into the Soviet bloc? Or would they turn to the United States for protection against suffering the same fate as Czechoslovakia in 1968?

It is vital to us all for the President of the United States to have the best possible answers to such questions. His chances of getting them are surely better if the CIA is not dependent solely on its staff experts, but can also tap the great reservoir of knowledge in our universities.

What we need is more, not less, contact between the universities and the CIA.

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## Despite New Regulations, the C.I.A. Remains Very Much a Campus Activist 'Agents' in Academia Are Recruiting Spies

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

WASHINGTON—In a brief and little noticed section of its final report, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence came up with a finding that is at the center of a growing controversy over the Central Intelligence Agency's intrusion into the United States academic community.

"The Central Intelligence Agency," the report said, "is now using several hundred academics, who in addition to providing leads and on occasion making introductions for intelligence purposes, occasionally write books and other material to be used for propaganda purposes abroad . . . These academics are located at over 100 American colleges, universities and related institutions. At the majority of institutions, no one other than the individual is aware of the C.I.A. link."

Though the report was issued in the spring of 1976, the public debate over this sort of operation by the espionage service continues. Last week, a House subcommittee opened hearings on the agency's relationships with news organizations and publishing houses. Over the next few months, its involvement with the academic community, and even religious organizations will be explored as Congress considers new rules and charters for intelligence gathering.

What makes the Senate report's conclusions most intriguing is that they describe not only a covert operation still underway, but one purportedly so important that the intelligence agencies were able to persuade the Senate committee to withhold the details from the public. One of three Senators dissenting from that decision was Walter F. Mondale, who as Vice President presumably will have something to say about any controls the Administration might want to impose on the intelligence community.

The public has known for more than a decade about the Central Intelligence Agency's dabbling in the academic world. An article in Ramparts magazine in 1967 opened an investigation that established that the agency secretly had funded the National Student Association, research projects from anthropology to zoology at a dozen or more colleges, labor unions, farm organizations and such activities as police science training.

The Attorney General then, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, under orders from President Johnson, drew up rules to restrict the abuses. But while publicly abiding by these regulations, the agency was covertly shifting funding mechanisms and budget dates to keep priority operations going.

Eight years later, the intrusions into campus life were further curtailed after new disclosures emerged during the Senate investigation. In an executive order, President Ford placed extra restrictions on the agency's use of academics and members of religious institutions. There was one significant omission, however: the secret agents on some 100 campuses.

Morton Halperin, a former aide in the Nixon White House who had been a wiretapping target and who now is an official of the Center for National Security Studies, has worked for several months to piece together what the Senate did not tell the public about the campus operation. Generally, he said, the "agents" are professors, teaching graduate assistants or members of the university administrative staff, motivated by a sense of patriotism or a need for money. In some cases, according to an agency source, professors are hoping for access to information and contacts they otherwise might not have.

Their main function is to help the agency identify and recruit spies from among the thousands of foreign students who study in this country. "They have general instructions to look for foreign students who may want to work for our Government, but occasionally there are special, urgent assignments like finding Brazilian physicists," Mr. Halperin said.

These undercover men also recommend American students to agency recruiters, prepare background reports on spy candidates, and obtain witting or unwitting help from other professors for propaganda writing and espionage at conferences. During the antiwar years, they reported in some instances on campus political atmosphere.

The Senate committee did not receive the names of individual agents but was provided a list of the schools involved. People who have seen the list have described the schools to Mr. Halperin as usually having large numbers of foreign students, extensive graduate programs and foreign-affairs studies that give the faculty international connections. Presumably, these are such large campuses as the University of Michigan, the University of California at Berkeley and Columbia University and other Ivy League schools.

The agency steadfastly has refused to identify the agents or even tell the universities that there are undercover operatives in their midst. John M. Ward, president of Amherst College, said in an interview that when he wrote to the agency and asked if there was a secret operative on campus (he didn't want the name), he was told the agency could not reply for "national security reasons." Mr. Ward said he has no evidence that Amherst is involved, but nonetheless he is preparing guidelines to be introduced before the faculty committee this spring that would require staff members to disclose if they secretly worked for central intelligence and also set standards for any other relationships with Government intelligence agencies.

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